More on Filibusters & Update

More on Filibusters & Update
Read Mike Rappaport’s latest post–once again, Rappaport has excellent points expressed with great clarity and eloquence. This will require an extended response–probably at the end of the week, as I will be on the road tomorrow and Thursday.
Also, Bruce Regal writes:

    Reading your dialogue with Rappaport about the “nuclear option” for changing Senate fillibuster rules with respect to judicial confirmation, one issue troubles me about your argument that I’m not sure Rappaport is quite confronting either. It seems to me you are relying on a limited and counter-intuitive notion of “nonconsent” as requiring some active, articulated decision rather than simply the absence of decision. It seems to me that the ordinary meaning of the concept of “consent” as required for judicial appointments reflects the idea that the failure of such consent, and thus the failure of a nomination, can be expressed as a simple failure by the body of the Senate to act as fully as by an affirmative decision to reject. Your notion that the Senate acts unconstitutionally when it fails to affirmatively consent or reject within some specified period of time (the end of a session perhaps , or some period set by the President, be it Washington or a successor, etc.) seems incompatible with this ordinary understanding of consent and its opposite, non-consent. If I am asked by my minor child to consent to a contract she wishes to enter into, I may express my decision not to consent either by saying “No” or by simply not acting. The consent required is my affirmative approval and anything short of that, including simple non-action, renders any contract my daughter may sign unenforceable. Whether I have said “No” or not makes no real difference to the enforceability of the contract, although it may make a difference to my daughter because the “No” presumably is a signal ending the discussion between us on the subject, whereas my nonresponsiveness may seem to leave the question open (although eventually she will probably give up asking). It seems to me the Senate’s constitutional obligation to grant consent or not can be met and is met with an unspoken nonconsent in the sa me way as a silent nonconsent to the contract of a minor. So long as the Senate as a body, and based on its own rules, is unable to end debate on a judicial confirmation its consent is properly deemed withheld and a nomination cannot be completed. This seems to me to be the full exercise of the “obligation” of the Senate to participate. As long as the Senate makes no final decision, the president, like my daughter, can continue to wait, indefinitely if necessary, for the Senate to grant its consent (even if the Senate turns the President down, the President can presumably try again in the future, as can my daughter), but in the meantime the Senate’s nonaction must be considered the equivalent of active non-consent for legal purposes, and should not be treated as some sort of unconstitutional refusal to participate as you suggest.
    Of course this analysis does not answer the harder question, which is what is the default position of the Senate in terms of how it makes decisions. Can it amend any rule, even a rule demanding supermajority decisions, with a simple majority decision. As you suggest at one point, this might be appropriate for many types of Senate actions, because one can always assume that even if the Senate acts by majority domination, minority rights will be protected by the courts. But when control of the courts is itself at stake, there is something constitutionally disturbing about the Senate acting without a significant minority veto available.

Update: C.E. Petit has a post responding to Regal. Here’s a taste:

    First of all, the filibuster deals with only part of the Senate’s powers (and, depending on one’s interpretation, responsibilities). The clause also requires advice from the Senate, not just consent. In other words, as I’ve remarked here previously, the clause could just say “consent”; “advice and” would be meaningless. In turn, that means two-way communication between the President and the Senate—which is the only interpretation reasonably consistent with the structure of the clause, of the Constitution’s appointment powers, and the Federalist Papers. (Unfortunately, Madison’s notes from the convention are less than clear on this issue.) In terms of communication, a filibuster is about as loud a piece of advice short of an explicit nomination list that one can imagine; it represents far more than just a “no” vote, but indicates that a substantial minority (at minimum) of the Senate said “not only not, but hell no!” (One would hope that this is more than partisan pique, but that’s the price we pay for a two-party incumbent-dominate system entrenched by first-past-the-post representation.) In that sense, then, a filibuster is a positive embracing of part of the Senate’s role under the “advice and consent” clause.

And scroll down one post for more from Seth Tillman.