Tillman on the Filibuster of Judicial Nominees
Seth Tillman comments on More from Rappaport on the Nuclear Option & the Filibuster (responding to this post):
- You (Solum) wrote:
- [Michael Rappaport wrote:]
-
First, the text of the Constitution does not expressly say that the Senate has an obligation to advice and consent. It only says “the President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States.” (emphasis added by Tillman)
I think we [Rappaport and Solum] have a disagreement here. I would think that “shall” implies obligation, and that given the structure of the clause it is clear that the obligation rests with both the President and the Senate.
I think you go too far here in asserting that “shall” implies obligation rather than merely the futurity of presidential and senate action with regard to offices not yet created by statute. If “shall” implied obligation, then — by that reasoning — would not the President have an obligation to appoint and commission all officers he had already nominated upon Senate confirmation? Traditionally, the power to appoint by the President (after nomination and senate advice and consent) is discretionary with the President. pace Marbury v. Madison. Do you think Marshall wrong here? (Nothing wrong with that — but maybe you ought to flag that for the reader!) Furthermore, under your position, if the House thought that the President failed to make timely nominations to vacant offices (i.e. he failed to nominate as duty bound by the first “shall” above), it would rightfully have a power to impeach. This seems an unnecessarily conte ntious and counterintuitive result. It seems to me that if the President has a constitutional duty to nominate (i.e. make timely nominations), it would have been differently and more clearly phrased. I think it more likely that the Founders relied on good incentives — that that President would desire to promote and elevate “his” people, and fill vacant offices with those loyal to him personally, his faction, and his policies.
Both the positions taken by Professor Rappaport and yourself fail to do justice to the full complement of the Constitution’s text. The Constitution gives the President an express power to convene just the House. See U.S. Const. art. II, Section 3 (“[The President] may, on extraordinary occassions, convene both Houses, or either of them ….”). Any theory of legislative procedure as mandated by the Constitution has to account for that power. Otherwise it is (or ought to be) a nonstarter — at least for textualists and originalists and formalists.
Compare Letters of Cato, No. VII (“No occasion can exist for calling the [House] without the senate; the words or either of them, must have been intended to apply only to the senate.”) (emphasis in the original), reprinted in 2 Herbert J. Storing, Murray Dry, The Complete Anti-Federalist 123, with The Federalist No. 77, at 410 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed. 2005) (“Except some cavils about the power of convening either house of the legislature and that of receiving ambassadors, no objection has been made to this class of authorities [the Constitution vests in the President by Antifederalists].”) (emphasis in the original).
Like N.Y. Governor George Clinton [widely thought to be Cato] and the Anti-federalists, both you and Professor Rappaport still need a theory to account for the meaning of U.S. const. art. II, Section 3. I have some idiosyncratic views in this regard, but as they do not relate to the filibuster or to presidential appointments per se, your readers are probably not interested.
