New Papers on the Net

New Papers on the Net
Here is the roundup:

    Geoffrey Sayre-McCord uploads Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory. Here is the abstract:

      Moral knowledge, to the extent anyone has it, is as much a matter of knowing how — how to act, react, feel and reflect appropriately — as it is a matter of knowing that — that injustice is wrong, courage is valuable, and care is due. Such knowledge is embodied in a range of capacities, abilities, and skills that are not acquired simply by learning that certain things are morally required or forbidden or that certain abilities and skills are important. 1 To lose sight of this fact, to focus exclusively on questions concerning what is commonly called propositional knowledge, is to lose one’s grip on (at least one crucial aspect of) the intimate connection between morality and action. At the same time, insofar as it suggests that moral capacities can be exhaustively accounted for by appeal to peoples’ cognitive states, to focus on propositional knowledge is to invite an overintellectualized picture of those capacities. No account of moral knowledge will be adequate unless it does justice to the ways in which knowing right from wrong, and good from bad, is not simply a matter of forming the correct beliefs but is a matter of acquiring certain abilities to act, react, feel, and reflect appropriately in the situations in which one finds oneself. And this means a satisfying treatment of moral epistemology must give due attention to what’s involved in knowing how to be moral.

    Oliver Hart (Harvard) posts Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships. From the abstract:

      The question of what should determine the boundaries between public and private firms in an advanced capitalist economy is a highly topical one. In this paper I will try to summarize some recent theoretical thinking on this issue. I will divide the paper into two parts. First, I will make some general remarks about the relationship between the theoretical literature on privatization and incomplete contracting theories of the firm. Second, I will use some of the ideas from this literature to develop a very preliminary model of public-private partnerships.

    Mariano-Florentino Cuellar (Stanford) posts Choosing Anti-Terror Targets by National Origin and Race. Here is the abstract:

      Here is an increasingly accepted post-September 11 view about racial and national origin profiling (i.e., “profiling”) in law enforcement: it may be troubling but its use should depend on the context (Part I). In other words, legislatures, courts, and executive officials should weigh the costs and benefits of using a particular law enforcement policy (i.e., profiling) in a given context (i.e., the war on terrorism). The problem is that this idea suffers from massive conceptual and practical difficulties, underscored by the fact that terms like cost, benefit, and terrorism are not self-explanatory. Yet the intuitive appeal of some anti-terror policies – including profiling – can result in a sort of “plausibility principle,” where legislatures, courts, and others often consider the merits of law enforcement strategies merely on the basis of whether such policies have a plausible justification (Part II). The problems that arise with general discussions of profiling are not likely to be solved by judicial review of individual profiling policies because the relevant constitutional doctrines – under equal protection, due process, and the Fourth and First Amendments – do little to regulate law enforcement’s decisions to investigate and prosecute (Part III). Which means that to decide whether profiling itself makes sense, we must consider the dynamics driving law enforcement’s use of discretion. At least one aspect of this should raise concern – that statutory and other legal changes increase law enforcement’s flexibility not only to choose whom to investigate, but what sorts of methods to deploy, including troubling tactics such as extended detention of immigrants, secret searches, or wiretaps (Part IV). Changes in the judicial regulation of discretion are possible but unlikely, and data will continue to be scarce. All of which makes it hard to accept even a principled “context-dependent” case for legitimizing profiling in the war on terror, and highlights the disconnection between asserted justifications for particular enforcement strategies and the likely performance of enforcement systems.

    Leo Strine, Jr. (Delaware Court of Chancery) uploads ‘Mediation Only’ Filings in the Delaware Court of Chancery: Can New Value Be Added by One of America’s Business Courts?, forthcoming in the Duke Law Journal. Here is the abstract:

      This essay, which is forthcoming in the Duke Law Review, advocates a new role for the Delaware Court of Chancery – the handling of “mediation only” business cases. Mediation only cases are matters submitted to the court solely for the purpose of invoking the services of a member of the Court of Chancery as a mediator to help the parties resolve a business dispute through a mediated settlement. The judicial-mediator would have no adjucative role in the traditional sense, but would solely act to facilitate a mutually acceptable resolution.
      In the essay, the author identifies the possible utility of this concept – which was recently enacted into law – and its consistency, in broad terms, with the historic role of the Delaware Court of Chancery in filling “gaps” in corporate instruments and commercial contracts.

    Steven Hinckley (University of South Carolina) uploads Your Money or Your Speech: The Children’s Internet Protection Act and the Congressional Assault on the First Amendment in Public Libraries, forthcoming in the Washington University Law Quarterly. From the abstract:

      The article contends that Congress has not met its burden under strict scrutiny of showing that Internet filtering in public libraries is constitutionally necessary to achieve the government’s interests in protecting children, and argues that software filters cannot possibly be applied without compromising a great deal of library patrons’ constitutionally protected online speech. The article concludes that, stripped of the facade of an innocent use of Congress’s spending power, the Children’s Internet Protection Act is merely the Computer Decency Act and the Child Online Protection Act in disguise – yet another clumsy congressional attempt to censor Internet content without sufficient concern for the damage it will do to the First Amendment rights of library patrons, many of whom use libraries as the only place where they can gain access to the incredible wealth of diverse information available on the Internet.