Fair Use and the Constitution

Fair Use and the Constitution
Orin Kerr (author of the must download Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting ‘Access’ and ‘Authorization’ in Computer Misuse Statutes) has a typically thoughtful post on the Conspiracy on the question whether there is a constitutional defect in the DMCA because it lacks a fair use exception. Kerr says no. Here is his reason:

    As I see it, the problem is that an affirmative defense only works in conjunction with its corresponding cause of action. While the Constitution may require an affirmative defense to liability under a specific cause of action, we don’t normally speak of someone having a “right” to do the act just because a particular law would not (even could not) punish it. Consider the insanity defense in criminal law, which, like fair use, is generally treated as an affirmative defense that excuses liability. Some courts have held that the insanity defense is required by the Due Process clause, and that legislative efforts to abolish the insanity defense are unconstitutional. See, e.g., Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001); State v. Straburg, 110 P. 1020 (Wash 1910). However, we don’t talk about having Due Process rights to commit crime while insane. That would be pretty odd, in fact; imagine a defense attorney claiming that a prison sentence violated his client’s constitutional rights by incapacitating his client and therefore making it impossible for him to commit crimes that would then be excused by the insanity defense. The trick is that although the Due Process clause may require a state to have an insanity defense, that does not mean that the law has to otherwise allow acts that if committed would fall under the insanity defense. At a conceptual level, I think the right to fair use is similar. It may be that the First Amendment requires a fair use defense to copyright infringement. As I see it, this does not necessarily mean that the First Amendment invalidates any other law (such as the DMCA) that prohibits acts that would constitute (or at least lead to) protected fair use.

There are many different things going on in this paragraph. Let me try to sort them out, one by one.

    –“[T]he problem is that an affirmative defense only works in conjunction with its corresponding cause of action.”

      First, it is hard to tell precisely what Kerr means when he says that “an affirmative defense only works in conjunction with its corresponding cause of action.” If he simply means that “affirmative defenses” are defenses to particular claims (or to get fancy “claim tokens”) by particular parties, then his claim is correct but trivial. If he means that any legal argument falling under the type “affirmative defense,” is limited to a corresponding legal theory (claim or cause of action), then Kerr’s claim is simply false. “Fraud” is an affirmative defense, but it is not bound to particular claim type. “Accord and satisfaction” is an affirmative defense, but can be raised against any claim type.
      Second, it is true that the “fair use” defense is bound up with copyright law. (It is, after all, in the statute.) There are similar doctrines that are all called “fair use,” i.e., trademark fair use, but these are not the same legal doctrine. So Kerr is right—the fair use affirmative defense is bound up with the copyright legal theory (claim or cause of action).

    –The analogy with the insanity defense.

      This wasn’t really necessary for Kerr’s argument, so I won’t have much to say. I would just like to point out that it is a poor analogy. There is no right to be insane, but there is a right to self-defense. The fact that some affirmative defenses are not rights-protecting defenses does not imply that no affirmative defenses are rights-protecting defenses. The use of the analogy would only advance Kerr’s claim if it were used in support of this latter claim, but that use of the analogy would constitute a logical fallacy and hence make Kerr’s argument invalid.

    –“ It may be that the First Amendment requires a fair use defense to copyright infringement. As I see it, this does not necessarily mean that the First Amendment invalidates any other law (such as the DMCA) that prohibits acts that would constitute (or at least lead to) protected fair use.”

      This is the real core of Kerr’s argument. Let’s take it apart, point by point:
      First, although Kerr says that it “may be” that the freedom of speech requires a fair use doctrine, there is substantial support for the proposition that the freedom of speech does require a fair use doctrine. See, e.g., Eldred.
      Second, Kerr says that if fair use is constitutionally required, “this does not necessarily mean that [the freedom of speech] invalidates any other law . . . that would constitute (or at least lead to) protected fair use.” Kerr has used the idea of necessity, introducing an important ambiguity in his claim. We need to think this through step by step to understand Kerr’s argument.

        + By saying that is “not necessary,” Kerr might mean that from the fact that the freedom of speech requires fair use as a defense to copyright, there is no logical implication that freedom of speech requires fair use as a defense to other legal theories (claims or causes of actions) such as the DMCA. If this is what Kerr means, he is right, but his point is trivial. Logical implication is a very stringent standard, a few legal conclusions about the content of the law follow as logical implications from the rules in analogous areas of law. We want to know if freedom of speech does require a fair use defense to the DMCA. Logical necessity is simply beside the point.
        + What we really need to know are the answers to questions like the following:

          # What is the constitutional basis for the fair use defense in copyright law?
          # Does that rationale extend to the DMCA?

        + Once we frame the issue in this way, we can see that Kerr does have a point. Here is an example. Suppose that a terrorist organization has an assassin awaiting a signal to attack a prominent political figure. Suppose further that the signal is a shortwave broadcast in which a passage from a copyrighted work (e.g., a paragraph from a novel) is read. Suppose further that the passage is short, and would constitute fair use. But of course, the terrorist who reads the passage will not have a fair use defense to a conspiracy charge, even though the freedom of speech might require a fair use defense to a copyright violation claim.
        + But our terrorist hypothetical has very little to tell us about the question whether the freedom of speech requires a fair use exception to the DMCA. Why not? Because the purpose and function of the DMCA is closely aligned to the purpose and function of the Copyright Act. Indeed, the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA are aimed at protecting copyrights. The argument that the freedom of speech requires some accommodation of fair use under the DMCA is based on the relationship between the function and purpose of the DMCA and the function and purpose of the copyright acts.

    So where does this leave us? I am not going to produce an affirmative argument that the freedom of speech requires a fair use exception to the DMCA. Many others have done that. The very modest point of this post is that Kerr has not produced an argument to the contrary.