Solum on Conceptual Translation

Lawrence B. Solum (Texas A&M University School of Law) has posted Conceptual Translation: From the Philosophy of Language to Textualist and Originalist Interpretation and Back Again on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Textualism and originalism now dominate statutory and constitutional interpretation at the Supreme Court, at least at the level of professed method. Judges speak routinely of “context,” “ordinary meaning,” and “ambiguity.” But they rarely avail themselves of the ideas from the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics that could ground the search for meaning. This Article describes two revolutions in the philosophy of language—speech act theory and Gricean pragmatics. The failure of lawyers, judges, and legal scholars to absorb these important developments has produced a gap between linguistic theory and judicial practice. That gap results in recurring patterns of error in textualist and originalist opinions. The errors stem from conceptual mistakes—from failures to grasp the nature of constitutional and statutory communication. One such error is “semantic stuffing,” a pattern of reasoning in which implicit content supplied by context is forced into the meaning of a word or phrase. Two cases, Zadvydas v. Davis and Yates v. United States, illustrate the pattern. To fill the gap between theory and practice, the Article proposes a practice of conceptual translation: rendering the distinctions of the philosophy of language in a form that lawyers and judges can use, and adapting those distinctions to the concepts and practices of the law. It is possible, but it is hard work, and philosophers and legal theorists must do it themselves.

As always, comments are welcome.

To receive new posts from Legal Theory Blog by email, get a free subscription to Legal Theory Stack.

Lawrence Solum