Ronen Perry (Haifa) has posted Should Wartime Activities Give Rise to Liability? (Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Traditionally, injuries caused by combatant activities have not been actionable under domestic tort law. This no-liability rule has taken three forms: a legislated immunity, as in Canada, Israel, and the United States; a judge-made immunity, as in Germany; or a categorical judicial no-duty-of-care determination, as in Australia and the United Kingdom. In addition, there is no liability for individual civilian harms under international law. Consequently, civilian victims of war lack a reliable causation-based avenue of redress. Some scholars have considered the development and use of alternative, often voluntary, compensation mechanisms under domestic law. Others have advocated the creation of liability regimes under international law. Yet in his thought-provoking book, Tort Liability in Warfare, Haim Abraham takes a third path, providing a comprehensive defense and guidelines for the implementation of a new framework of domestic tort liability for wartime activities. The proposed reform is threefold: (1) abolition of the combatant activities no-liability rule, (2) application of existing tort doctrine to military activities, and (3) recognition of a general liability-negating justification—compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and rules of engagement (ROE).
This Commentary presents some reservations about the first component—the abolition of the no-liability rule—and about the implementation of the proposed reform. Part I challenges the theoretical underpinnings of the book’s thesis, claiming that the choice of corrective justice over competing theories (monistic or pluralistic) is not properly defended. Part II rejects the book’s three rationales for overturning the no-liability rule, namely its inconsistency with the general erosion of sovereign immunity, its alleged deviation from substantive rule of law principles, and its asserted lack of valid justifications. Part III discusses the book’s more concrete argument that injuries caused by combatant activities should, in principle, be actionable in negligence. It challenges both the willingness to recognize a duty of care and the proposed nexus between the standard of care and IHL/ROE. Part IV rebukes the book’s argument that tort liability for combatant activities is superior to currently used alternatives (ex gratia payments and state-operated insurance schemes). Lastly, Part V contests the book’s implementational argument that the appropriate forum for adjudicating claims for belligerent wrongs is the judiciary of the state that inflicted the wrong or is affiliated with the wrongdoer. A recurring criticism throughout this Commentary is that identifying flaws in legal regimes that the book seeks to reject does not, without more, reinforce the case for the alternative it advocates. This is so for three reasons: such flaws can often be mitigated; the book’s proposal may exhibit similar or even additional problems; and the rejected alternatives may have weighty advantages that the book downplays or overlooks.
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