Stephanie H. Barclay (Georgetown University Law Center) has posted Implementing the Establishment Clause on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
When the en banc Fifth Circuit upheld Texas’s requirement that every public-school classroom display the Ten Commandments, it applied the same historical hallmarks of establishment that prominent scholars now invoke to argue the displays are unconstitutional. But the disagreement does not center on Founding-era history. It is, at bottom, a disagreement about implementation. The key question is as follows: how should a court translate a constitutional provision and a body of historical practice into an administrable legal standard. That translation requires choices that history does not make. Perhaps most importantly, it requires a choice about the level of generality at which the relevant doctrine should be pitched. The focus on text and history has not eliminated judicial discretion. It has cabined it. But it has also relocated it.
This Article makes two key claims about that discretion. First, history does not uniquely support the critics’ choice of a high level of generality. In fact, certain levels of generality are likely ruled out by history, and the level the critics have chosen is likely out of bounds. That is so because a principled version of the critics’ proposed doctrinal tests would condemn widespread practices that received widespread acceptance at the Founding. Recognizing this problem, for those sorts of examples the critics retreat from their tests to a context-bound, I-know-it-when-I-see-it sort of inquiry that ultimately attempts to resurrect the amorphous, unworkable, and unpredictable Lemon test the Supreme Court rejected.
Second, the discretion that remains, though irreducible, is not lawless. I argue that this discretion ought to be disciplined by the reasons we have law at all: coordination and democratic accountability. The Article draws on Raz, Aquinas, and Finnis to explain how the law must concretize underdetermined purposes through an authoritative choice, or a determinatio. The Supreme Court’s choice of identifying six hallmarks of established religion is such an authoritative determination, as is the Fifth Circuit’s choice to read those hallmarks at a low level of generality. That authoritative determination is superior to the potential implementing doctrines that the critics offer. It better coordinates officials and courts; conserves democratic authority; rests on fewer contestable premises about incorporation, standing, and remedies; and honors the positive-law character of the disestablishment provision in the constitution.
While this Article focuses on the Establishment Clause, its insights illustrate a larger dispute about how courts can faithfully build doctrines to implement underdetermined constitutional meaning. Courts must do so faithfully not by denying discretion and acting as though history hands them only one choice. Rather, they must make practical judgments about doctrines that will reduce false positives whilst still conserving coordination and democratic accountability.
Highly Recommended!
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