Daniel M. Klerman (University of Southern California Gould School of Law) and Alex Klerman (University of Chicago) have posted Forum Shopping and Judge Shopping: An Empirical Analysis of Immigration Policy Cases (Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This article measures the extent of forum and judge shopping in cases challenging the legality of immigration policies during the Biden and Trump administrations. The evidence shows that both liberal and conservative plaintiffs engage in forum shopping, but only conservative plaintiffs engage in judge shopping. The limited evidence now available suggests that recent attempts to curb forum and judge shopping—the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. CASA (2025) and the Judicial Conference’s 2024 policy regarding district-wide assignment—have been ineffective in curbing judge and forum shopping. To prevent forum and judge shopping, this article recommends nationwide random assignment of litigation of national importance.
Recommended!
To receive new posts from Legal Theory Blog by email, get a free subscription to Legal Theory Stack.
Lawrence Solum