Second-Order Slippery Slopes
My post, What’s Wrong with Bills of Attainder, responded to this post, over at Antirealist. I made some pretty conventional arguments–that a blanket ban on bills of attainder serves rule of law values and prevented abuses of power. Antirealist has a long and nuanced response that covers quite a bit of ground. Let me focus on one, fascinating, argument:
- But, if I understand him correctly, Lawrence seems to be suggesting that, because ex post facto laws threaten autonomy in most cases, the rule of law is best served by a blanket ban on them, rather than a case by case approach. I find this unpersuasive, because it seems to rule out the making of important distinctions at too high a level of abstraction. If we shouldn’t distinguish between retroactive legislation which does and which does not threaten autonomy because of slippery slope concerns, why shouldn’t we apply the same logic to other important distinctions – between just and unjust forms of discrimination, say? Another kind of slippery slope will appear, threatening to make pragmatic concerns outweigh principles in law-making. But this is paradoxical, because there must be principles to give rise to those concerns in the first place.
My argument was based on the notion of a slippery slope, and Antirealist’s argument is a variation on one of the classic objections to slippery slope arguments. Let’s give Antirealist’s argument a name, the second-order slippery slope. If we use first-order slippery slope arguments to justify rules (as opposed to case-by-case decisionmaking) in one case, then there is no principled stopping point. We are on the slippery slope to making every decision on the basis of first-order slippery-slope arguments. Here are some thoughts:
- First, the distinction between first and second order slippery slopes itself supplies the necessary stopping point. That is, if true, this argument suggests that each slippery slop should be considered on its own merits.
Second, the case of bills of attainder is relevantly different that the case of the second-order slippery slope. Why? In the case of bills of attainder, there is reason to believe that a general rule is necessary to prevent abuse. For familiar reasons, we worry that legislatures will compromise liberty and the rule of law for partisan reasons. Thus, we worry that a labor parliament might pass a bill of attainder to attack a prominent former conservative politician (e.g. Archer, the original subject of Antirealist’s post), but not pass such a bill respecting a similarly situated former labour politician. Even if this would not work a serious injustice in one case, once the mechanism is available, legislatures are ill suited to determine whether this dangerous tool may be used safely in the case at hand. Bills of attainder are always risky, because they place decision-making authority regarding the punishment of a particular individual in the hands of an institution that, by institutional design, is not equipped with the appropriate safeguards.
Third, there is, so far as I can see, no similar reason to worry about the second-order slippery slope as a general phenomenon. Quite the contrary. Although political actors (legislatures, executives) may be tempted to act on an ad hoc basis to maximize their own power and freedom of action, it does not seem plausible that they will go around imagining illusory slippery slopes in order to establish rules that limit their power.
Fourth, it is not clear that the second-order slippery slope leads to pernicious results. My original argument for a rule against bills of attainder was that it would enhance the rule of law. Antirealist argues that this creates a second-order slippery slope, upon which we would slide to a possible future state of the world in which many more decisions are made on the basis of rules rather than case-by-case reasoning. But the rule of law is, in general, a good thing. Whereas, I provided a fairly specific argument as to why the slippery slope that results from case-by-case evaluation of bills of attainder ends in an undesirable place, Antirealist provides no such argument for the second-order slippery slope.
Fifth, the key to avoiding fallacious reasoning when making slippery-slope arguments is to provide a mechanism: explain why the slope is slippery. I’ve provided the mechanism in the case of bills of attainder, but Antirealist has not met this burden with respect to the second-order slippery slope.
One more thing: I urge you to read Eugene Volokh’s important article on slippery slopes (html and pdf) There is a lot more good stuff in Antirealist’s very interesting post.
