Nielson on the American Presidency Post-Slaughter

Aaron L. Nielson (University of Texas at Austin – School of Law) has posted The American Presidency Post-Slaughter (Harvard Law Review, forthcoming) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

In the wake of Trump v. Slaughter, the American presidency finds itself much more constitutionally powerful. Since 1935, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States has anchored agency independence by allowing Congress to prevent the President from firing agency officials based on policy disagreement. After Slaughter, that anchor is gone. Slaughter, moreover, may portend even greater change.

Slaughter, however, also raises an important statutory question. The Court decided Humphrey’s Executor more than 90 years ago. Would Congress have delegated so much policymaking authority to agencies since then had it foreseen later judicial decisions that increase presidential control over that authority? The Court’s severability doctrine asks whether Congress would have preferred an agency subject to greater presidential control over no agency at all, and almost invariably concludes that Congress would have preferred the former. But even on the Court’s own terms, that is the wrong question. The right one is whether Congress would have preferred an agency with less authority over one subject to the combined loss of each restriction on presidential control. If Congress knew, for example, not only that the President would be able to fire agency heads, but also could direct discretion formally delegated to agencies, ignore legislative vetoes, and receive broad immunity, would Congress have enacted the same delegations? The Court has never addressed the aggregate effect of its holdings. Slaughter, however, forces this issue to the forefront.

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