Adrian Vermeule has posted Holmes on Emgerencies on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Justice Holmes’s judicial and extrajudicial writings implicitly suggest a coherent account of emergencies, law, and constitutional adjudication. I will call this account the epistemic theory of emergencies. Its main elements are that (1) the existence and duration of an emergency are questions of fact; (2) during emergencies courts should not practice judicial minimalism or the passive virtues; (3) during emergencies there are no non-derogable rights – government can do anything if circumstances warrant; (4) the main checks on governmental action during emergencies are that (a) legislative limitation of executive powers trumps, where the political branches disagree; and (b) judges engage in ex post sunsetting, once an emergency has in fact ended, by declaring the emergency terminated and rescinding the government’s emergency powers. I then offer a broader evaluation of Holmes’s views, suggesting that the epistemic theory of emergencies is the best version of a common-law strategy for regulating government action during emergencies. Throughout, the enterprise is not biographical, historical or doctrinal; it is theoretical.
And some more from the text:
There is a strong case that the Court’s anti-minimalist posture was correct, despite Justice Thomas’s suggestion, in dissent, that the Court should have waited until after a military trial had actually taken place.49 Part of what drove Justice Thomas’s view may have been the undoubted truth that the costs and benefits to the Court, or to judicial system generally, counsel waiting; the Court could decide in the future with better information about the actual operation of the military commission system, and there is no real loss to the judges from foregoing a decision now. On the Holmesian view, however, this overlooks a kind of externality, arising because the costs and benefits to the Court need not track net costs and benefits to the broader legal order and society overall. To practice the passive virtues, or minimalism, in these circumstances is to elevate a divergence between private and social costs to the level of a constitutional principle.
Suppose that by waiting until a concrete prosecution had occurred, the Court would have acquired only a small increment of relevant information, perhaps because the basic question in the case was simply whether the military commissions were permissible at all under relevant statutes and treaties,50 or because the prosecution would have proceeded in predictable fashion, merely implementing rules that were already apparent on the face of the executive order and implementing regulations. Suppose also that a great deal of uncertainty about the validity of the military commissions would have persisted, with costs to many actors in the broader system: detainees who must undergo military trials or suffer under a Damoclean threat of military trials, with only a vague chance of eventual judicial relief; administration officials who must formulate an overall response to the threat of terrorism under long-term ignorance about whether military commissions, an important component of that response, are valid; and legislators and citizens who face an uncertain target or baseline for democratic debate. The last point underscores a major social benefit of Hamdan, which was that it clarified the statutory and treaty-based rules and thus provided a fixed point from which democratic debate could proceed, resulting in the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which drew lines that are quite clear (whether or not constitutional or desirable).
Uncertainty is a cost whenever courts practice the passive virtues, or minimalism, but the high stakes of the questions just described illustrate the basic concern I have attributed to Holmes, which is that the costs of uncertainty are systematically higher during emergencies. If so, and if the offsetting benefits are no higher during emergencies, then courts should be less minimalist and less passive during emergencies than in normal times. Of course it is difficult, for Holmes or for us, to say with any precisions how these costs and benefits net out, and how to assess the comparative statics of uncertainty, error and option value across emergencies and normal times. Yet the view that minimalism and the passive virtues are desirable (generally or during emergencies) itself assumes answers to these questions, just as much as Holmes’s contrary view. There is no escape from the cost-benefit question; neither the minimalist view nor the anti-minimalist view can be dismissed a priori.
Yet another really interesting, original, and provocative paper from Vermeule–who has a knack for finding unoccupied positions in the argument space and changing the way we think about important issues. Highly recommended!
