Dryzek and List on the

Dryzek and List on the Relationship between Public Choice Theory & Deliberative Democracy
Courtesy of Political Theory Daily Review, John S. Dryzek (Australian National University) and Christian List (Oxford) have a paper entitled Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation. Here is the abstract:

    The two most influential traditions of contemporary theorizing about democracy, social choice theory and deliberative democracy, are generally thought to be at loggerheads, in that the former demonstrates the impossibility, instability or meaninglessness of the rational collective outcomes sought by the latter. We argue that the two traditions can be reconciled. After expounding the central Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility results, we reassess their implications, identifying the conditions under which meaningful democratic decision making is possible. We argue that deliberation can promote these conditions, and hence that social choice theory suggests not that democratic decision making is impossible, but rather that democracy must have a deliberative aspect.

And here is a taste from the body of their, very impressive and interesting paper:

    To summarize, the identified escape-routes from social-choicetheoretic
    impossibility problems are the following:

      (i) If deliberation induces individuals to reveal their preferences and views truthfully (hypothesis 1), then strategic manipulation becomes less of a threat in deliberation, and a relaxation of condition (S) provides an acceptable escape-route from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, compatible with all other conditions of the theorem.
      (ii) If deliberation induces preference structuration – narrowing the domain of actual preference profiles to a domain in which the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite problems do not apply – (hypothesis 2), then both cycling and strategic manipulation become less of a threat in deliberation, and relaxation of condition (U) provides acceptable escape-routes from Arrow’s theorem and from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, compatible with all other conditions of these theorems.
      (iii) If deliberation helps uncover or create the tacit issue-dimensions that ‘cause’ a lack of preference structuration, and induce greater preference structuration in each separate dimension (hypothesis 3), then dimension-specific aggregation in accordance with all of the conditions of Arrow’s theorem or the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (except condition (U)) becomes possible, and one of the following solutions to the overall decision problem may become available: subdividing the decision, lexicographic hierarchies of dimensions, logrolling, or demonstrating the nature of the problem and creatively crafting new alternatives.
      (iv) If deliberation can produce agreement on what the set of relevant alternatives is (hypothesis 4), then agenda manipulation becomes less of a threat, and relaxation of condition (I) provides an acceptable escape-route from Arrow’s theorem, compatible with all other conditions of the theorem.
      (v) If deliberation can produce agreement on an interpersonally comparable evaluation variable for assessing individual interests and a decision principle for aggregating individual interests into a collective outcome (hypothesis 5), then a solution to Arrow’s problem that is consistent with all of Arrow’s conditions becomes available for a range of institutionally soluble collective allocation or distribution problems.

    The role of deliberation is to bring about situations in which the antecedents of these “if-then” results are satisfied. The normative component of our argument is that the constraints required for bringing about such situations are either inherent in, or at least consistent with, core deliberative principles. Moreover, our arguments rest on empirical hypotheses about the effects of deliberation. Whether or not deliberation will induce each of the antecedents of the “if-then” results ultimately depends on the specifics of particular cases.