McGinnis & Rappaport on Amending the Filibuster Rule
Readers of LTB will want to read Mike Rappaport & John MicGinnis’s Op/Ed on amending the filibuster rule. As Mike blogs on The Right Coast:
- My op ed piece, written with John McGinnis, on the filibustering of judicial nominees has now been published. The article makes three basic points. First, it argues that the so called nuclear option is a fully constitutional mechanism for changing the filibuster rule. In fact, it is constitutionally required that a majority of the Senate be able to change the filibuster rule; otherwise, a majority of the Senate could pass norms that would be as entrenched against change as constitutional provisions are.
And from the op/ed:
- The Senate majority’s power to modify the filibuster is strongly supported by constitutional principles. Both the text and structure of the Constitution show that only one of three possible views about the constitutionality of the judicial filibuster is correct. The first view – advocated most recently by Senate majority leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn. – is that filibustering judges is simply unconstitutional. But the Constitution expressly gives the Senate the right to fashion its own rules of procedure and nowhere requires application of majority rule to confirmations.
The second view – advocated by many Democrats – is that a majority has no right to change the filibuster rule because the Senate rules still require a two-thirds vote to end a filibuster mounted against a resolution to change the filibuster. But this Senate rule conflicts with the structure of the Constitution.
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The third and constitutionally correct view is that the Senate can choose to retain the filibuster rule, but that a majority must be able to change it. The Senate can thereby exercise its full constitutional authority to fashion rules of procedure but past majorities of the Senate cannot put current majorities in a procedural straitjacket. Thus, a change in the filibuster rule by a majority is not a “nuclear” option but instead the constitutional option – the route contemplated by our founding document.
McGinnis & Rappaport’s analysis is very persuasive. I am not sure I agree with their rejection of the first view–at least if we view the question as one of the original meaning of the constitution. Here is a letter I wrote to Senator Cornyn on this question:
- Dear Senator Cornyn:
I am writing in connection with issues raised at the Hearings on Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a majority is denied its right to consent, held on Tuesday, May 6, 2003 at 2:30 p.m. This letter supplements my letter of May 4, 2003. I am a Professor of Law at the University of San Diego, and I have written extensively on issues of constitutional law and judicial selection.
In this letter, I address the original understanding of the advice and consent clause in light of the text of Article II and the interaction between the first President and the first Congress. My conclusion is that the Senate has a constitutional duty to provide advice and consent in a timely fashion, and that this duty is breached when a Minority filibuster delays the vote on a Presidential nominee beyond the end of a session of Congress. This conclusion is supported by the following considerations.
First, when the Senate gives advice and consent it performs an executive function. This fact is directly supported by the language of the clause. What is the constitutional responsibility of the Senate with respect to advice and consent? The United States Constitution Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, provides that the President
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shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.
The phrase “advice and consent” is borrowed from the laws of Great Britain where it was used to describe the consultative relationship between Crown and Privy Council—an executive department. Appointment itself is an executive function.
Second, because advice and consent is an executive function, it is distinguishable from the Senate’s legislative function. When the Senate acts in its legislative capacity, it owes no constitutional duties to the President, but when the Senate acts as an executive body—the fundamental nature of its role is different. The Senate itself recognizes this distinction in a variety of ways; for example, the Senate goes into executive session to consider judicial nominations.
Third, the Senate has a constitutional duty to give advice and consent to the President. Perhaps this is obvious, but examination of the early historical practice is nonetheless instructive. How did the first President, George Washington, view the Senate’s obligations with respect to advice and consent? He believed that when the Senate performed this executive role, its relationship to the President was analogous to the Privy Council. President Washington wrote:
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The Senate when these powers are exercised, is evidently a Council only to the President, however [necessary] its concurrence may be to his Acts. It seems incident to this relation between them, that not only the time but the place and manner of consultation should be with the President. It is probable that the place may vary. The indisposition or inclination of the President may require, that the Senate should be summoned to the President’s House. Whenever the Government shall have buildings of its own, an executive Chamber will no doubt be provided, where the Senate will generally attend the President. It is not impossible that the place may be made to depend in some degree on the nature of the business. In the appointment to offices, the agency of the Senate is purely executive, and they may be summoned to the President.
President Washington’s understanding was that the Senate could be called by the President to give advice and consent on his timetable. This understanding accords with the role of the Privy Council in the England.
Fourth, early in the history of the Republic, the settled practice became that the Senate would remain in its own chamber, but would give the President advice and consent within a reasonable time. Although Washington’s specific proposal was not adopted, his understanding of the fundamentally executive nature of the Senate’s role in advice and consent provides an important insight into the meaning of the Article II, Section 2, Clause 2. From the text and early history, a general principle can be adduced. This general principle is that advice and consent must be timely. President Washington believed that this principle could be implemented by giving the President the authority to demand advice and consent when he deemed it necessary. The first Senate countered by providing advice and consent that was timely, while reserving to itself the authority to schedule its own executive sessions.
Fifth, the duty to give timely advice and consent means, at a minimum, that the Senate should vote on nominations during the Session in which the nomination is made. The text of the advice and consent clause when read in light of the early historical practice provides compelling evidence that the Senate has a constitutional duty to give advice and consent to the President. From the existence of the duty, it follows that the duty must be completed in a timely fashion. If the Senate has a constitutional duty to give advice and consent, it cannot escape that duty through indefinite delay. The constitution does not provide a specific period of days, and hence it might be argued that the Senate may wait for months or even years before acting on a nomination. There is, however, strong evidence from another provision of the Constitution as to the outer limit of constitutionally permissible delay. The Recess Appointments Clause, Article II, Section 2, Clause 3, provides:
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The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.
This provision strongly suggests that the founders contemplated that the Senate would give and advice and either grant or deny consent within the session in which the nomination was made. Any delay of advice and consent beyond the session in which the nomination was made would be a breach of the Senate’s constitutional duty.
Sixth, allowing indefinite filibusters of Presidential nominees is inconsistent with the constitutional duty to provide advice and consent in a timely fashion. This is not to say that the Senate cannot provide individual Senators or the Minority with a procedural opportunity to trigger extended debate. But that opportunity cannot be so extensive as to allow its abuse by extending debate beyond the end of the current Session of Congress—excepting of course in the case of a nomination that is submitted at the end of the Session.
Seventh, the current extended filibusters of multiple nominees require the Senate to address the question whether its rules provide a sufficient guarantee that the Senate will fulfill its constitutional duty to give advice and consent within a reasonable time. It is true that this question should also have been raised in a variety of situations. It is possible that prior Senates have not fulfilled their constitutional responsibilities. But this is not excuse for ducking the question.
In sum, the text and history of the Constitution suggest that the Senate has a duty to give advice and consent in a timely fashion. Although the constitution does not provide a period of days, the relationship between the Advice and Consent Clause and the Recess Appointments Clause suggests that the Senate’s constitutional duty should be fulfilled during the session in which the nomination is made. The current Senate Rules permit a determined minority to breach that Constitutional duty through a filibuster. The Senate can cure this constitutional defect by amending its rules in a variety of ways. The Senate might provide that debate can be closed by a simple majority vote after a reasonable period of time has elapsed, or the Senate might provide that nominations will come to the floor automatically within a specific number of days after submission.
There is, of course, another route by which the Senate could fulfill its constitutional duty to give advice and consent in a timely fashion. The Minority could end the filibuster voluntarily. In the long run, this course might be the wisest. Amending the rules over the objection of the minority will do little to restore the spirit of cooperation that is vital to the Senate’s role as the “cooling plate” for the “hot tea” produced by the House.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this letter.
Sincerely yours,
Lawrence B. Solum
Professor of Law
