Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto and Patricio A Fernandez (Harvard University and Harvard University) have posted Case Law vs. Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Case law develops gradually through the rulings of appellate judges who have heterogeneous preferences but are partially bound by stare decisis. We present a formal model of this process and show that its evolution progresses towards greater predictability and efficiency of legal rules. Since statutes do not share this evolutionary property, case law is the superior system when the efficient rule is time-invariant, even if the legislature is more democratically representative than individual judges. In the presence of social change, we find that the ideal legal system includes both legislation and jurisprudence as sources of law. Our model thus explains the observed cross-country correlation of better economic outcomes with case law, and predicts the gradual convergence of the two main legal families towards a mixed system.
And a bit more from the conclusion:
Stare decisis implies that rulings that deviate from precedent are personally costly to the judge. Through the decisions of judges with heterogeneous preferences, case law develops as a never-ending process that evolves towards greater predictability and efficiency. Legislatures may be more democratically representative than individual judges, and another benefit of statutes is the short-run certainty of written law. Yet the evolution of case law provides superior outcomes in the long run, unless the e¢ cient rule is changing over time. When the optimum is too mutable, common law should include a role for statutes to correct the rigidity of binding precedent. However, pure statute law is never optimal: the ideal system is mixed, with both legislation and jurisprudence as sources of law.
This explains why legal institutions turn out to be less conducive to e¢ ciency in French civil-law countries, which formally deny a role for case law. In fact, the most significant inefficiencies are found in developing countries that adopted the French legal system andstill cling in practice to the Napoleonic dogma that judges must not make law.
Instead, advanced civil-law countries, including France itself, are ever more similar to common-law countries in the importance they actually assign to precedent. Our model sheds light on this gradual convergence of traditionally disparate legal families, which we interpret as a natural movement towards an optimal mixed system. Establishing and securing the law-making role of jurisprudence and the ongoing judicial interpretation of statutes should therefore be a priority of legal reform.
Formal models, but quite interesting for the jurisprudential assumptions.
