Enoch on Agency and Normativity

David Enoch has posted Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What Is Constitutive of Action (Philosophical Review 2006; 115(2): 169-198) on SSRN. Here is a taste:

There is a fairly widespread—and very influential—hope among philosophers interested in the status of normativity that the solution to our metaethical and, more generally, metanormative problems will emerge from the philosophy of action. What we need, so the thought goes, is to better understand what action and agency consist in. With this understanding in hand, we will then have all that we need in order to give a philosophical account of reasons for action, or of (practical) normativity altogether.

And here is a bit more:

In this essay, I will argue that these hopes are groundless. I will focus on the metanormative hope, but—as will become clear—showing that the solution to our metanormative problems will not come from what is constitutive of action will also devastate the hope of gaining significant insight into fi rst-order, normative truths by focusing (only) on what is constitutive of action.2 Or so, at least, I shall argue.