Lori Ringhand has provided some excellent comments on the judicial activism debate. For the background, check out the following posts:
Ringhand on Judicial Activism & the Rehnquist Court
And here are Ringhand’s thoughts:
Thanks to Larry for his thoughtful comments on my work, and for the opportunity to respond. As readers of this blog know, my most recent project (discussed here in a New York Times editorial) attempts to bring some much needed clarity to the term "judicial activism" by defining it in reference to how often Supreme Court justices vote to invalidate state or federal legislation, or to overturn existing precedents. Criticism of this approach has taken two distinct paths. Some critics, such as Matthew Franck writing here for the National Review, argue that my definition of “activism” drains the term of all meaning, rendering it an essentially empty and uninteresting concept. Others critics argue – as Larry does below – that even if my approach has some value, certain votes, such as those to invalidate statutes on federalism grounds, should be excluded. (Larry also disputes my inclusion of votes to overturn precedent. My paper acknowledges the difficulties with using that as a measure of activism, so I will not rehash those arguments here).
Let me respond to these critiques in turn. First, by reducing the word “activism” to its objectively ascertainable elements, my work clearly does attempt to strip the term of the value-laden baggage it has been burdened with. Far from draining the term of all meaning, however, this approach is the only way to give the term any distinct content at all. As currently used in the political dialogue (usually by the right but increasingly by the left) “judicial activism” has come to mean little more than a judicial decision with which one disagrees. Franck, for example, defines activism as the “wrongful” use of judicial review. Used this way, the term serves no purpose other than to attach an inflammatory epithet to what is in fact a substantive disagreement about the meaning of the Constitution. But, as Franck admits, we do not as a nation agree on what the Constitution means, or how it should be interpreted. Consequently, any definition of "activism" that rests on assumptions about correct Constitutional answers will be meaningful only to those who already share those underlying assumptions. It is not, in short, my approach that has rendered the term meaningless; the term as currently used is meaningless because it is built on a premise – the correct meaning of the Constitution – which is itself contested.
Given all of this, why do I attempt to salvage the term by reducing it to its objectively verifiable components rather than advocate, as Andrew Cohen does in this Washington Post column (and as I myself have done in other places) for getting rid of it altogether? Because beneath the rhetoric and hyperbole, there is a valuable question to be answered here: in the face of contested Constitutional meaning, should a justice act with humility or hubris? Should a justice vigorously enforce the Constitution as she sees it, regardless of whether other justices or different branches of government disagree, or should she opt to use her power more cautiously, deferring to other Constitutional decision makers in all but the clearest cases?
That question, it seems to me, lies at the very heart of questions about the judiciary’s role in our democratic system of government. It does not, however, have an easy answer. We tend to want justices who are both robust and restrained; justices who will both stand up and defer to elected officials. Scholarship like mine, showing which approach different justices have taken in the various types of cases that come before them, does not (and does not purport to) tell us which of these models of judging we as a society should prefer. But it does tell us a great deal about how each individual justice views his or her role in our Constitutional system. Discussing this within the rubric of the term “activism”, moreover, restores that term to what Larry himself argues was its original purpose – to measure the amount of “space” courts faced with constitutional questions leave to legislatures to make Constitutional judgments of their own.
But what of Larry’s suggestion that federalism questions (cases involving preemption, the Commerce Clause, section 5 of the 14th Amendment, section 2 of the 15th Amendment, and the 11th Amendment) should not be included in any objective measure of activism? Larry argues that these cases are fundamentally different because they involve the distribution of power between the state and national government, rather than straightforward questions of deference to democratic decision makers. But of course the proper distribution of power between the state and federal government is itself as constitutionally contested as the meaning of the Due Process Clause. So it is not clear to me why Larry accepts (or at least accepts for the sake of argument) that the latter raises meaningful questions of judicial deference but the former do not.
Nor is it self-evident that federal courts should be more deferential to state decision makers than to federal ones – it is Congress, after all, that is the Supreme Court’s co-equal branch of government. If what we are measuring is a justice’s readiness to use his or her judicial power aggressively, a willingness to invalidate federal statutes certainly is a relevant measure. Finally, the line Larry draws between structural and substantive Constitutional questions seems unstable to me. Surely the supporters (and perhaps even more so the opponents) of federal statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the National Labor Relations Act – all passed and upheld under the constitutional provisions Larry says should be taken off the table – would be surprised to hear that judicial review of these statutes does not involve important questions of substantive rights. One can argue, as I suspect Larry would, that robust judicial review in these areas is good, but that does not mean that it should not be part of the measure of robustness in the first place.
Just a few comments–very brief:
From my pespective, the most important passage in Ringhand’s most recent remarks is the following one: "First, by reducing the word “activism” to its objectively ascertainable elements, my work clearly does attempt to strip the term of the value-laden baggage it has been burdened with. Far from draining the term of all meaning, however, this approach is the only way to give the term any distinct content at all. As currently used in the political dialogue (usually by the right but increasingly by the left) “judicial activism” has come to mean little more than a judicial decision with which one disagrees." First, Ringhand’s goal–conceptual clarity–is right on target. Second, it seems to me that Ringhand has made a controversial and probably mistaken assumption–that the only way to get conceptual clarity is to simplify a concept so that it can be measured or quantified. That is a very dubious assumption. It confuses "clarity" with "measurability". The two are not the same. Of course, if we limited our conceptual vocabulary to the measurable or quantifiable, things might be easier in a certain sense, but we would also have an impoverished picture of the world–without important normative concepts liike "justice," "legitimacy," and "autonomy." Third, Ringhand seems to equate being "value laden" with "baggage" that lacks "distinct content." This is surely an error. "Value laden" language is essential to normative analysis–without it normative theoretical debate is simply impossible. In the case at hand, there is an alternative to the simplifying but simplistic move of reducing the value-laden term, "judicial activism" to "votes to invalidate legislation." The alternative is to construct a theory (or a set of alternative theories) of "judicial activism." That may mean fine grained distinctions, but complexity and conceptual rigor is simply not the same thing as the lack of distinct content.
One more point. Ringhand writes, "Larry argues that these cases are fundamentally different because they involve the distribution of power between the state and national government, rather than straightforward questions of deference to democratic decision makers. But of course the proper distribution of power between the state and federal government is itself as constitutionally contested as the meaning of the Due Process Clause. So it is not clear to me why Larry accepts (or at least accepts for the sake of argument) that the latter raises meaningful questions of judicial deference but the former do not." Here it seems to me that Ringhand’s argument is nonresponsive and conceptually confused. The motivation for my point was that the phrase "judicial activism" has a conceptual history. That history links the notion to the related idea of deference to decisions made by democratically elected legislatures. Federalism cases necessarily involve the question of which democratically elected legislature should have the power to address a given question. If courts decide to uphold a state statute, they reduce federal power. If they decide Congress has exclusive power over an issue, the courts reduce the power of democratically elected state legislatures. Of course, we could have a theory of democracy that told us which decisions about federalism were right and then that theory could be incorporated into our definition of judicial activism–but this is precisely the kind of strategy that Ringhand wishes to avoid. The point that she does make, "the proper distribution of power between the state and federal government is itself as constitutionally contested as the meaning of the Due Process Clause" is simply not relevant. I am not questioning the contestation or contestability of federalism decisions–quite the contrary. My argument is that these decisions do not relate to the best understanding of "judicial activism" in the same way that individual rights decisions and especially substantive due process decisions do. At a minimum, Ringhand should acknowledge this issue and offer an alternative measure that backs out the various federalism issues.
There is more that needs to be said, but I want to emphasize that my criticisms are offered in the spirit of Ringhand’s valuable project. What is needed here is conceptual clarity not conceptual oversimplification. In this case, the path to clarity requires close attention to the history of the concept of "judicial activism". Once that history is on the table, we can then construct alternative conceptions of the concept and alternative measures of "judicial activism." That is the path to intellectual honesty and scholarly rigor on a topic that can all to easily become partisan, rhetorically shrill, and conceptually confused.
One more thing. If there is a clear lesson here, it is that the phrase "judicial activism" should be used with great care in scholarly writing. If I might offer a rule of thumb, scholars who employ this term should read Keenan Kmiec’s THE ORIGIN AND CURRENT MEANINGS OF "JUDICIAL ACTIVISM" closely and formulate definitions of "judicial activism" in light of Kmiec’s careful unpacking of the concept. This phrase is easily misunderstood and should only be used if accompanied by a careful and analytically precise definition or conceptual exposition in text–not buried in a footnote.
