Ernest Sosa has a new paper entitled Experimental Philosophy & Philosophical Intuition on the Internet. Here is a taste from the introduction:
Our topic is experimental philosophy as a naturalistic movement, and its bearing on the value of intuitions in philosophy. I explore first how the movement might bear on philosophy more generally, and how it might amount to something novel and promising. Then I turn to one accomplishment repeatedly claimed for it already: namely, the discrediting of armchair intuitions as used in philosophy.
And a bit more from the paper:
Consider a further case study of how an apparent clash of intuitions can turn out to be only verbal. We turn to a recent paper by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols about the bearing of intuitions on the problematic of free will and determinism.vi In their view intuitions relevant to this problematic are heavily influenced by affect. Here is a brief description of the study, its results, and the morals drawn.
First the distinction between a fully determinist universe D and an indetermininst universe I is presented to experimental subjects, 90% of whom report that our own universe is more like I than like D.
Now for the shocking results: When subjects are asked the abstract question whether agents in D are fully morally responsible, 86% say that they are not: no agent can be fully morally responsible for doing what he is fully determined to do. However, when a dastardly deed is attributed with a wealth of detail to a particular agent in D, and those same subjects are asked whether that agent is then fully morally responsible, 72% report that in their view he is!
Knobe and Nichols consider various ways to account for this amazing divergence. In the end, they find it most plausible to think that some performance error is responsible. Affect, they suggest, degrades intellectual performance in general whether the relevant competence be memory, perception, inference, etc.
Of course, that explanation will leave intuition affected as lightly as are perception, memory, and inference, unless some further relevant difference can be specified.
In any case, there is an alternative explanation that will cast no affect-involving doubt on the intuitions in play. This other possibility came to mind on reading their paper, and was soon confirmed in the article on moral responsibility in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, where we are told that at least two different senses of ‘moral responsibility’ have emerged: the attributability sense, and the accountability sense.
An important paper & highly recommended.
