Richard Arneson has posted Joel Feinberg and the Justification of Hard Paternalism on the Internet. Here is a taste:
Joel Feinberg was a brilliant philosopher whose work in social and moral philosophy is a legacy of excellent, even stunning achievement. Perhaps his most memorable achievement is his four-volume treatise on The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, and perhaps the most striking jewel in this crowning achievement is his passionate and deeply insightful treatment of paternalism.1 Feinberg opposes Legal Paternalism, the doctrine that “it is always a good reason in support of a [criminal law] prohibition that it is necessary to prevent harm (physical, psychological, or economic) to the actor himself.” Against this doctrine Feinberg asserts that when an agent’s sufficiently voluntary choice causes harm to herself or risk of harm to herself, this category of harm-to-self is never a good reason in support of criminal law prohibition of that type of conduct. Feinberg’s opposition to Legal Paternalism is soft, not hard, because his position allows that the prevention of harm to the agent that would arise from self-harming conduct that is less than substantially voluntary is always a good reason for criminal law prohibition. Transposing the terminology in the usual way, we say that the Legal Paternalism that Feinberg opposes is hard paternalism. In Feinberg’s hands the opposition to hard paternalism is associated with a doctrine of autonomy and personal sovereignty and revealed to be a fundamental commitment of a liberal political philosophy. The problem of paternalism goes to the heart of the issue, under what conditions and for what reasons it is morally acceptable for state agencies coercively to restrict the liberty of an individual in a decent society.
