Dennis Patterson (Rutgers University School of Law, Camden) has posted Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts (Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 545–557, 2006) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In a recent comment on H.L.A. Hart’s ‘Postscript’ to ‘The Concept of Law’, Ronald Dworkin claims that the meaning of legal and political concepts may be understood by analogy to the meaning of natural kind concepts like tiger, gold and water. This article questions the efficacy of Dworkin’s claims by challenging the use of natural kinds as the basis for a semantic theory of legal and political concepts. Additionally, even if there are natural kinds, Dworkin’s arguments for their efficacy in jurisprudence are problematic and unpersuasive. One problem for Dworkin is that his embrace of natural kinds undermines the fit side of his fit/justification model of adjudication. Finally, because in matters of value there is no methodological equivalent to the scientific method, there is little hope of finding hidden essences to explain the meaning of legal and political concepts.
Highly recommended.
