Gardbaum on the Commerce Power

Stephen A. Gardbaum (University of California, Los Angeles – School of Law) has posted The Breadth versus the Depth of Congress’s Commerce Power (UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 06-40, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION, Richard Epstein & Michael Greve, eds., Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This article argues that the "depth" of Congress’s commerce power, and not only the more familiar focus on its breadth, is important for understanding the power’s full contours. It does so by charting the inverse relation between the two during the Lochner and New Deal eras. Although the Lochner Court undoubtedly held a limited view of the commerce power’s breadth, it also held a relatively unlimited view of the depth of that power – in the sense of the impact on state authority of its valid exercise. The Lochner Court conceived of the commerce power as latently exclusive of state authority, meaning that valid federal laws automatically preempt state law in the same area. This contrasts with the modern understanding established during the New Deal, in which Congress’s commerce power is mostly concurrent with state authority and its valid exercise is presumed not to preempt state law.

Indeed, its conception of the depth of the commerce clause challenges the common understanding of the Lochner Court as anti-regulation and pro-state. For in relevant contexts, the Lochner Court favored not simply the market in the abstract but the national market. Where economic union was at stake, the Court’s belief in a uniform national market trumped both its laissez-faire and federalism commitments. Here it looked with favor on regulation at the national level and was keen to find that federal laws displaced state authority in situations where later Supreme Courts would not.

The Lochner Court’s twin positions on breadth and depth were exactly reversed during the New Deal as part of a new federalism balance. Although the New Deal Court expanded the breadth of national powers under the commerce clause, maintaining the Lochner era’s conception of its depth would have eviscerated large areas of traditional state authority, which it was not prepared to do. Accordingly, the New Deal Court reduced the commerce clause’s depth by holding that Congress’s power is no longer to be understood as latently exclusive but as genuinely concurrent with that of the states, and by moving from automatic preemption to the modern presumption against preemption.