Liam Murphy has posted What Matters? Morality and the Concept of Law on the Internet. Here is a taste:
When a judge considers a case in which a plain reading of legal materials such as constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions, or custom does not determine the result, she might appeal to her own moral judgment in order to reach a decision. If so, we could say that she did more than just apply existing law; if there is a doctrine of stare decisis in the jurisdiction, we could say that she made new law. But we could also say the opposite. Perhaps legal materials or accepted canons of interpretation direct her to appeal to her own moral judgment in such a case; this could justify claiming that she did nothing but apply the law. And that claim will seem plausible to some even if legal materials and canons of interpretation give our judge little or no guidance about what to do in hard cases such as this, leaving her with no option but to decide in the manner that seems best justified in terms of the considerations of political morality relevant to her role. An observer who agreed that the best method of adjudication involved moral reasoning on the judge’s part may find it appropriate, for that reason, to say that she applied the law only. He might add that to say that she is in part making law is to introduce an artificial discontinuity within the domain of conscientious adjudication: If a judge is acting in accordance with law and follows the best justified method of adjudication, what is the point in saying that she is doing anything other than apply the law? Such a view would be consistent with classical common law theory and with the position that Ronald Dworkin calls “law as integrity.”
