The Download of the Week is The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract Damages by Nate Oman. Here is the abstract:
The law of contracts is complex but remarkably stable. What we lack is a widely accepted interpretation of that law as embodying a coherent set of normative choices. Some scholars have suggested that either economic efficiency or personal autonomy provide unifying principles of contract law. These two approaches, however, seem incommensurable, which suggests that we must reject at least one of them in order to have a coherent theory. This article dissents from this view and has a simple thesis: Economic accounts of the current doctrine governing contract damages have failed, but efficiency arguments remain key to any adequate theory of contract law. Contractual liability – like virtually all civil liability – is structured around the concept of bilateralism, meaning that damages are always paid by defeated defendants to victorious plaintiffs. Ultimately, economic accounts of this basic feature are unpersuasive. This criticism, however, leaves untouched many of the key economic insights into the doctrine of contract damages. The limited failure of economic interpretations points toward a principled accommodation of both autonomy and efficiency in a single vision of contract law where notions of autonomy provide the basic structure and economics fills in most of the doctrinal detail.
And from the text
The problem of over reliance can be illustrated with a simple example. Imagine that Jack promises to supply Jill with a widget-making machine, and Jill informs Jack that in reliance on the contract she will be purchasing a large supply of widget materials to manufacture widgets for the insatiable widget market. Jack then finds that Jane, who is a more efficient widget maker, will offer him an amount for the widget machine such that he can fully compensate Jill and still make a profit. True to the efficient breach theory, Jack renegs on his agreement, Jill sues to recover her expectation damages, and Jack pockets the difference between Jill’s damages and the price paid by Jane for the widget-making machine. Unfortunately, one problem mars this otherwise delightful picture of social efficiency: The effort and resources spent in procuring the unused bales of widget materials in Jill’s warehouse are a waste. The problem is that once Jack and Jill have contracted, Jill has no incentive to consider the likelihood of Jack’s performance. If Jack breaches, Jill will be fully compensated by the expectation damages. It would be more efficient, however, for Jill to consider the likelihood of Jack breaching, and structure her reliance accordingly. Simply stated, it is socially wasteful for promisees to act as though their promisors’ eyes will never stray to other opportunities after the contract is signed.
In order to induce efficient reliance, we want a damage measure that gives promisees an incentive to consider the probability that promisors will not perform. For example, a restitution measure would restore to the promisee only what she gave the promisor in return for his now breached promise. In other words, the promisee would be protected against the sort of crass opportunism that would result if a promisor could take money in return for a promise that he never performed. Accordingly, it provides the basic trust necessary to induce parties to deal in the first place.60 However, the restitution measure gives the promisee absolutely no compensation for any expenses incurred in reliance on the promisor. Accordingly, the promisee will have every incentive to consider the probability of the promisor’s breach when making her reliance decisions, thus avoiding inefficiently high levels of reliance.
Highly recommended! Download it while its hot!
