Jennifer Nou (University of Chicago – Law School) has posted The Parapresidency (University of Chicago Law Review, forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Modern presidents rely on temporary, quasi-private actors who operate alongside the institutional presidency. This Essay identifies and theorizes this emerging domain of presidential power as the “parapresidency.” Its members derive practical authority from presidential proximity, occupy positions that are transitory by design, and retain significant private interests. Using the Department of Government Efficiency as its principal example, the analysis traces the parapresidency’s rise to structural constraints on presidential staffing and explains why it is especially attractive to populist presidents. It also shows how the parapresidency can expand presidential control while diffusing legal and political accountability, heightening the risks of corruption and self-dealing. It concludes by proposing greater transparency, stronger conflict-of-interest restrictions, and more searching judicial scrutiny of this emerging form of presidential power.
Highly Recommended!
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