Edmilson Raulino has posted The Modern Voto de Cabresto: State Regulation as an Instrument of Electoral Capture on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This article proposes a contemporary reinterpretation of the phenomenon historically known in Brazil as “voto de cabresto” (a Brazilian form of electoral clientelism, literally the “halter vote”), investigating the hypothesis that mechanisms of electoral dependence may take forms distinct from the coercion and patronage characteristic of classical coronelismo. The research argues that the strategically timed use of the state’s regulatory function may, in certain circumstances, generate political capital through the creation, toleration, or subsequent correction of public problems. To test this hypothesis, the study examines fixed-odds betting in Brazil, from its legalization in 2018 and subsequent regulation to the Provisional Measure issued on 25 September 2026, which prohibited the operation, offering, intermediation and advertising of so-called “bets” nine days before the first round of the elections. The analysis combines Constitutional, Administrative and Electoral Law with contributions from regulatory capture theory and comparative political science. It focuses on the relationship between administrative misuse of power (desvio de finalidade), abuse of political power, the constitutional requirements for provisional measures, and the electorally relevant use of regulatory functions. The article concludes that the case offers sufficient elements for legal examination of the hypothesis of electoral instrumentalization of regulatory activity, although the concrete finding of abuse of political power depends on proof of circumstances, purpose and gravity as required by electoral law.
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Lawrence Solum