Richard Briffault (Columbia University — Law School) has posted Revolving In on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The “revolving door” – that is, the movement of policy-makers from the private sector into government and back out again – is a longstanding issue of concern in law, political science, public administration, and government ethics. Although some applaud this exchange of personnel between the public and private sectors, the general tenor of popular, political, and academic coverage of the revolving door has been highly negative, marked by frequent references to corruption, capture, and conflicts of interest. One striking feature of the scholarly treatment and nearly all the legal regulation of the revolving door has been its focus on “revolving out,” that is government employees leaving for the private sector to become lobbyists, consultants, or lawyers representing clients before their former government agencies. Conflicts regulation of the outward-bound revolving door is widespread at all levels of government, but the revolving door swings both ways and there has been much less attention to or regulation of the conflicts issues that arise when lobbyists, corporate executives, or other representatives of private interests enter government. At first blush, that seems paradoxical since the regulatory capture concern behind the focus on the revolving door should be particularly acute when the regulated become government regulators. However, as I discuss, the issues raised by what I call “revolving in” do not fit as easily within traditional government ethics regulation as those posed by revolving out. This article addresses the gap in the legal analysis and regulation of revolving in. It explores the scope of revolving in, the conflicts of interest it poses, and the patchwork of measures that apply to it. Drawing on general government ethics principles and emergent efforts at regulation, it then proposes a set of ethics rules to deal with the conflicts of interest posed by revolving in. It concludes by acknowledging that although the more robust ethics regulation is necessary, ethics rules alone, without political action, are unlikely to be enough to deal with the underlying concern about regulatory capture.
Recommended.
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