McWilliam on the Meaning of “Arms” in the Second Amendment

Jamie G. McWilliam (University of Wyoming — Firearms Research Center) has posted Arms, forthcoming in 101 Tulane Law Review (2026-2027), on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen reoriented Second Amendment doctrine around text and history but left unresolved a foundational threshold question: what qualifies as an “Arm” under the Amendment’s text. In the wake of Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, lower courts have increasingly resolved cases at this preliminary stage, excluding weapons, components, and related equipment from the Amendment’s textual scope, thereby bypassing the historical inquiry Bruen requires and producing deep doctrinal fragmentation. This Article offers a systematic examination of the term “Arms” and the textual tests courts employ to define it. By conducting an historical textual analysis within the teleological framework that structured Founding-era legal reasoning, this Article argues that “Arms” was publicly understood to encompass all items that facilitate the lawful defense of self and community. These arms are entitled to prima facie protection but may be subject to regulation upon an adequate showing of an analogous historical tradition. By restoring the proper role of text and purpose in Second Amendment interpretation, this Article offers a coherent, administrable framework for identifying “Arms” that respects Bruen‘s methodology without foreclosing legitimate regulation.

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