Julieta A. Rabanos (University of Girona) has posted On the Concept of Authority and the Unity of Practical Reason on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In recent decades, the concept of authority has been treated and discussed almost exclusively as a concept based on reasons of some kind within a broader theoretical framework that views legal philosophy (only) through the lens of practical reasoning. Based on these assumptions, much of the discussion has focused on what kind of reasons are involved, what impact the presence of authority has on the practical reasoning of agents, whether or not there is unity in practical reasoning, and whether or not – and in what sense – the outcome of that reasoning involving those kinds of reasons is conclusive.
The aim of this chapter is to critically analyse this choice and its theoretical and practical consequences. First, through the analysis of Joseph Raz’s and John Finnis’ theoretical frameworks, I will show how concepts of authority such as Raz’s and Finnis’ are intrinsically linked –and heavily rely on– the endorsement of the idea that legal philosophy as a branch of practical philosophy and the endorsement of a so-called dominant position about practical reasoning, which characterises it as unitary under moral precepts. Second, I will points out some issues that can be tracked to this dependence. One set of problems is connected to the priority of the committed concept of authority based on moral acceptance, and the difficulties it implies for evaluating legitimacy. Another set is connected to the specific conception of acceptance they are built on, how it impacts on key notions such as effectiveness and compliance, and the difficulties the resulting concepts face at a conceptual, epistemic, and practical levels. Finally, a last set relates to how the strong dependence on these commitments might affect the plausibility and usefulness of these concepts.