Fadel on Public Reason, Islamic Law, and Human Rights

Mohammad Fadel (University of Toronto, Law) has posted Public Reason as a Strategy for Principled Reconciliation: The Case of Islamic Law and International Human Rights (Chicago Journal of International Law, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The salient question of the twenty-first question may turn out to be religion, and its relationship to secular norms such as international human rights law. In this paper, I explore a Rawlsian strategy for effecting a principled reconciliation of Islamic law and international human rights law. The need for effecting such reconciliation is pressing, as is evidenced by first, the large number of Muslim-majority states that adopt Islamic law-based reservations to international human rights conventions, and second, the distrust that non-Muslim majorities often exhibit to their Muslim minorities which is in part fueled by suggestions that Muslims are insufficiently committed to human rights norms. Rawls’ framework for analyzing how incompatible theories of the good may nevertheless co-exist within one constitutional regime under conditions that give rise to an “overlapping consensus” suggests that advocates of Islamic law and international human rights law should seek to articulate both the norms of international human rights law and their justifications in a manner that could reasonably result in the good faith acceptance by Muslims of such norms, and the good-faith acceptance of Islamic law by international human rights law as a legitimate interlocutor. I propose a framework for effecting this reconciliation through various strategies: first, revision of non-conforming substantive rules of Islamic law wherever possible to do so without engaging in controversial moral or theological interpretation so as to render them in conformity with norms of international human rights law; second, where there is a genuine contradiction between Islamic religious doctrine and the norms of international human rights law, by the more robust recognition within international human rights law of the right of Muslims (as well as other religiously-motivated citizens) to continue to observe voluntarily Islamic law (or other religiously-motivated norms) – even where adherence to such norms results in discrimination – as a matter of their human right to religious freedom, while Muslim states would agree not to impose such religiously-motivated rules as part of its positive legislation; and third, requiring Muslim states to disavow restrictions on freedom of conscience, including laws penalizing apostasy, even in civil law.

And a bit more from the text:

. . . liberals should be indifferent if governments of Muslim majority jurisdictions adopt egalitarian legislation for reasons other than an absolutist commitment to equality, so long as the rules themselves are consistent with the legal requirements of equality.

Similarly, I also assume that most Muslims are indifferent to any legal regime so long as that legal regime does not compel them to undertake acts that they subjectively deem sinful or prevent them from fulfilling the devotional elements of Islam. Accordingly, they should be indifferent to whether a state enacts positive legislation mandating an Islamic vision of the good, so long as the state gives Muslims the freedom to live in accordance with that vision.

While liberalism and Islam are philosophically incompatible as comprehensive theories of the good, Rawls suggests that they nevertheless may agree on enough basic political propositions such that their relationship is characterized by an “overlapping consensus.” It is worth exploring this possibility since the payoff would be quite significant—the emergence of a truly universal human rights regime, and the reduction in the scope and scale of tensions between Muslims and the world order.

Elsewhere, I have argued that public reason is legitimate from the perspective of Islamic theology, ethics, and law.7 Given that Islamic law, in its current form, reflects the norms of a pre-modern legal culture, it must be subjected to review for compatibility with the norms of public reason. But this process should be inherently no different from that which occurred in other jurisdictions that transitioned from legal systems that recognized gender and legal hierarchies to ones in which norms of non-discrimination largely prevail.

Very interesting & highly recommended.