Marcy Strauss (Loyola Law School (Los Angeles)) has posted Understanding Davis (Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Vol. 40, Forthcoming, 2007) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Forty years ago, in the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona the Supreme Court held that in order to safeguard the right against self incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, a person has the right to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation. Fifteen years later, in Edwards v. Arizona, the Court made clear it’s commitment to providing suspects with counsel during interrogation by setting forth a bright line rule: when a suspect invokes the right to have counsel present during questioning, no further interrogation may occur until counsel is made available to the suspect or until the suspect initiates further discussion.
What was unclear, however, in both Edwards or Miranda, was precisely what constituted an invocation of the right to counsel. More specifically, lower courts differed on whether police must stop interrogating a suspect who has made an “ambiguous” or equivocal request for counsel. In 1994, the Supreme Court finally entered the fray. In Davis v. United States the Court held that only unambiguous requests for counsel trigger the protections of Edwards. Thus, interrogating officers may continue their questioning when a suspect ambiguously asserts his right to counsel during a custodial interrogation.This decision spurred a chorus of protests and criticism among commentators. Many argued that the Davis decision eviscerated the “bright line” nature of Edwards which was among its chief benefits. Instead of a clear rule to guide officers and courts alike, a new uncertainty crept into the calculation of whether a suspect has the right to an attorney. More specifically, many critics argued that the Davis ruling would have a disproportionate effect on women and members of certain cultures who often phrase requests in an equivocal manner.
This article is an attempt to take the Davis debate to a new level by analyzing the actual effect of the holding. Specifically, how have the courts distinguished between ambiguous and unambiguous requests for counsel? After all, figuring out what is equivocal and what isn’t requires judgment. How have the lower courts characterized different “types” of requests for counsel? And, to the extent possible to assess, has the prediction that minorities and women would especially suffer been proven accurate? After categorizing all of the lower court published decisions—state and federal for the last 12 years— I attempt to provide an answer to these questions.
