Discussion of Mele at the Garden

At the Garden of Forking Paths (the terrific blog on agency theory), there is a marvelous discussion going.  The paper is Al Mele’s "Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility"  Here is a taste:

Mele’s historical condition on responsibility

Mele argues that everyone (regardless of one’s views on incompatibilism) should recognize an historical condition on freedom and moral responsibility for one’s action at a given time. Imagine an agent who involuntarily undergoes a motivational overhaul such that he now performs action A as an expression of values that were "very recently produced in a way that bypassed his capacities for control over his mental life by value engineering." Mele argues that if we flesh out the situation in certain ways (see p.8 for a full and careful statement of the scenario Mele has in mind), then independent of our views concerning compatibilism, and even if all typical compatibilist conditions on freedom are meet, we have good reason to regard the action as nonautonomous, as not having been freely and responsibly performed. And he goes on to draw the conclusion that a plausible compatibilism will recognize an historical dimension to freedom, requiring that the values a free agent expresses in action must have been developed in a way that does not undercut ordinary means of exercising control over one’s mental life.

I agree with all of this. And if this is correct, then an argument for incompatibilism that assume that there is no relevant difference between just-prior-to-action manipulation scenarios and non-manipulative deterministic scenarios should be unpersuasive. Still, there might be reason to poke at certain details in Mele’s discussion here. Notice that the sufficient condition he provides (p.8) for an agent’s being unresponsible for A-ing owing to recent manipulation (NFM) involves his being unable to do otherwise on a compatibilist reading. This is a stronger form of inability than an incompatibilist one (as compatibilist ability is less demanding than incompatibilist ability). Why restrict NFM in this way? Granted, NFM lays down a sufficient condition, not a necessary one, but it still seems a gratuitous weakening of the condition. Suppose manipulation that leaves me strongly desiring to A (contrary to what I would have desired previously) and with no countervailing desire, and so I unhesitatingly A. Surely the compatibilist can agree no less than the incompatibilist that in this case, even if I am able to do otherwise in a compatibilist sense (but not in the plain incompatibilist sense, I act unfreely.

O.k., now suppose that metaphysical freedom in fact requires indeterminism and that the way my action unfolds post-manipulation corresponds to the indeterminist account that best captures the notion of freedom, at least apart from a plausible historical condition on freedom. (I suggest you consult a volume entitled PERSONS AND CAUSES for helpful clues on what this might involve.) On these assumptions, it’s tempting to say that while the agent’s freedom is diminished, it is not lacking altogether.  (Note on p.7 Mele’s passing use of the qualifier, "unfree — to a significant extent.") For possible significance of this last point, I turn to issue 2.