More on the New York Times on Judicial Activism

On Monday, I put up a post entitled New York Times on "Judicial Activism" commenting on Activism Is in the Eye of the Ideologist, a NYT editorial, and on Lori Ringhand’s paper, Activism and the Rehnquist Court.

Today, on National Review Online, Matthew J. Franck has a piece entitled Depends What the Meaning of "Judicial Activism" Is.  Here’s a taste of Franck:

No wonder the Times embraced Ringhand’s study. It provides the editors with a seemingly scientific tu quoque. But Ringhand cuts through no knots at all, and what she presents as a great achievement in clarification is in fact an exercise in obfuscation. For the fact is that for its entire history, the term “judicial activism” has been freighted with judgment, a prescriptive term and not merely a descriptive one. Ringhand’s reductionist attempt to be “objective” does not supply a new and sounder meaning to the term; it deprives it of any meaning at all. And it seems odd to watch a law professor approach this subject with an attitude that is dismissive of all the legal arguments that have raged about constitutional interpretation throughout our history. That kind of apparent hostility to legal reasoning, to the forms and practices of argumentation, coupled with a rather adolescent faith in the revelatory power of “data” that can be coded and counted, is more common among my benighted colleagues in political science than it is in the law professoriate.

I’ve already noted that “judicial activism” is unavoidably prescriptive, not just descriptive. Properly understood, it does not describe every species of jurisprudential sin. It does not, for instance, include every instance in which the Court declines to declare unconstitutional a law that is unconstitutional — not even every such instance in which the Court wrongly declines to act. We would need a name other than “activism,” after all, for a jurisprudence of acquiescence.

And this provides a wonderful oppotunity to recommend Keenan Kmiec’s THE ORIGIN AND CURRENT MEANINGS OF "JUDICIAL ACTIVISM". Kmiec’s piece is terrific–a really superb contribution to the understanding of the origin and lineage of the phrase. Here is a taste of the article:

One might expect that the term "judicial activism" first appeared in a respected judge’s dissent, or in a seminal law review article. This does not appear to be the case. Rather, somewhat fittingly, the first use of the term to attract substantial attention from the public occurred in a popular magazine, in an article meant for a general audience written by a non-lawyer.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr. introduced the term "judicial activism" to the public in a Fortune magazine article in January 1947. Schlesinger’s article profiled all nine Supreme Court justices on the Court at that time and explained the alliances and divisions among them. The article characterized Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutlege as the "Judicial Activists" and Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton as the "Champions of Self Restraint." Justice Reed and Chief Justice Vinson comprised a middle group.

By 1947, none of the justices openly questioned the constitutionality of the New Deal. Instead, the Court split over the interpretation of legislation and "the proper function of the judiciary in a democracy." Schlesinger describes the competing approaches:

This conflict may be described in several ways. The Black-Douglas group believes that the Supreme Court can play an affirmative role in promoting the social welfare; the Frankfurter-Jackson group advocates a policy of judicial self-restraint. One group is more concerned with the employment of the judicial power for their own conception of the social good; the other with expanding the range of allowable judgment for legislatures, even if it means upholding conclusions they privately condemn. One group regards the Court as an instrument to achieve desired social results; the second as an instrument to permit the other branches of government to achieve the results the people want for better or worse. In brief, the Black-Douglas wing appears to be more concerned with settling particular cases in accordance with their own social preconceptions; the Frankfurter-Jackson wing with preserving the judiciary in its established but limited place in the American system.

Each side that Schlesinger portrayed in Fortune is the product of a distinct legal world-view. The Black-Douglas view has its roots in the Yale Law School, which had strong ties to both Black and Douglas. This view perceived legal reasoning as malleable, rather than scientific. As Schlesinger describes, the Yale Law School "Judicial Activist" camp believed and wrote that "[t]he resources of legal artifice, the ambiguity of precedents, the range of applicable doctrine, are all so extensive that in most cases in which there is a reasonable difference of opinion a judge can come out on either side without straining the fabric of legal logic." [FN30] In short, there are no unassailable "right" answers, and policy concerns move to the forefront. "A wise judge," if he accepts this philosophy, "knows that political choice is inevitable; he makes no false pretense of objectivity and consciously exercises the judicial power with an eye to social results."

This early usage is very interesting–suggesting that the "judicial activism"/"judicial restraint" debate is more complex than Ringhand’s study would allow & in particular that striking down legislation and/or overturning precedent is an imperfect measure of these concepts as they were originally understood.

Here is a passage from Ringhand’s article that deals with the methodological issue:

The use of judicial power to invalidate federal and state laws, and to overturn precedent, is not, of course, an uncontested way to measure “judicial activism”. It is, however, the only measure that does not rest on an antecedent determination of whether a judge reached a “correct” constitutional decision in a given case. Notions of constitutional correctness invariably depend on contested theories of constitutional interpretation. My goal is to examine actual judicial behavior in a non-normative, non-theoretical way that is independent of such theories.

This paragraph deserves a more extended treatment than I can provide on this occasion, but here are some thoughts:

First, given the historical context of the phrase "judicial activism," the use of the precedent measure seems unjustified.  I myself advocate a very robust view of the role of stare decisis in the Supreme Court, but I am convinced by Kmiec that it is sloppy and historically inaccurate to use activist in this context.  Ringhand should excise this measure from the paper.

Second, there is a real problem with the inclusion of some federalism cases in the measure.  In the federal system in the United States, deference to democratic branches interacts with issues concerning distribution of power between the state and national government, making it virtually impossible to classify federalism based decisions that strike down state or federal statutes on the basis of a historically informed understanding of the phrase "judicial activism."  Ringhand should at least present an alternative measure that excludes preemption, dormant commerce clause, commercial clause, fourteenth amendment section five, and eleventh amendment decisions from her data.  This will make a very large difference to her results.  As Ringhand states, "the conservative justices cast the majority of their federal invalidation votes in cases involving federalism or the First Amendment. In contrast, the liberal justices cast their federal invalidation votes overwhelmingly in the First Amendment area."  And she writes, "The most significant area of disagreement between the liberal and conservative justices clearly is in the federalism cases."  Likewise, "federalism" and "economic activity" (which includes the "dormant commerce clause"–a federalism provision) were significant in the invalidation of state stautes.

None of this is meant to question the value of Ringhand’s work–but it does suggest that there is substantial room for refinement.  Very interesting.