Edith Beerdsen (Temple University, James E. Beasley School of Law) has posted Expert Evidence in Times of Skepticism and Distrust, 125 Mich. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2027) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Trust in science and scientists is faltering. Additionally, trust in judges as neutral arbiters is at an all-time low. In court, the backdrop of science skepticism, denialism, and distrust is exposing that the frameworks that govern the admissibility of expert evidence are ill-suited to the task of evaluating and applying scientific knowledge for the resolution of civil disputes in a manner that honors accuracy and democratic legitimacy. Drawing from recent literature from the philosophy of science and theories of deliberative democracy, this Article argues that our existing evidentiary frameworks are based on outdated and incomplete conceptions of the nature of authority and objectivity and a poor fit for resolving issues involving contested science. They misallocate responsibilities between experts, judges, and jurors, misconceiving these actors’ proper roles. They thereby risk a further alienation of those who have already lost their trust in science and the judiciary and, crucially, deprive the jury of the chance to fulfill its rightful epistemic function. This Article calls for altering both how scientific information is admitted into evidence and how juries interact with it. Skeptical attitudes suggest that we should leave more to the jury, not less. By involving the jury in decisions of admissibility and permitting more active engagement with expert evidence, open-minded consideration of information by a critical audience may be possible. Juror participation is not only a matter of legitimacy and procedure; it is also of epistemic importance.
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