Douglas W. Portmore has posted Welfare, Achievement, and Self-Sacrifice on the web. Here is the abstract:
Recently, some philosophers have argued that, by holding that it’s the achievement of our aims or goals as opposed to the fulfillment of our desires that contributes to our welfare, we can accommodate what’s attractive about the desire theory of welfare while avoiding its many problems. The view that the achievement of one’s goals contributes to one’s welfare is what I call the “Achievement View.” A similar view holds that the meaningfulness of one’s self-sacrifices contributes to one’s welfare, where one’s self-sacrifices count as meaningful if and only if they were not for naught. I call this view the “Not-for-Naught View,” or the “NFN View” for short. In this paper, I argue that the NFN View has all the advantages that the Achievement View has plus some others, that it has none of the disadvantages that the Achievement View has, and that, therefore, those sympathetic to the Achievement View should accept the NFN View instead.