W. Stephen Westermann has posted A Theory of Autonomy Entitlements: One View of the Cathedral Nave Dedicated to Constitutional Rights and Other Individual Liberties on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The goal of this article is to advance the theory of legal entitlements by developing a new theory of autonomy entitlements to describe fundamental constitutional rights and other individual liberties. Such rights, a primary objective of which is to provide, directly or indirectly, a zone of autonomy for the holder, what this article refers to as “autonomy entitlements,” are poorly understood because courts and commentators have misconceived the building block entitlement form of such entitlements to be the standard property entitlement. This is mistaken because the standard property entitlement form fails to prevent a third party from inducing the holder to cede the entitlement, and along with it its intended autonomy-related benefits, merely by making delivery of a valuable good, service or benefit contingent on waiver or transfer of the entitlement, what this article calls “unrelated economic surplus inducement.” Thus, if the right to free political speech were structured as a standard property entitlement, the state could easily strip some component of this right from citizens, independently of how much each individually values it, by making delivery of a sufficiently valuable tax exemption contingent on its waiver. Similarly, if an entitlement to be free from workplace discrimination were structured as a standard property entitlement, an employer could defeat lawmakers’ anti-discrimination goals simply by making employment contingent on waiver of the entitlement. In order to preclude such outcomes and enable the holder to enjoy the full subjective value he or she attaches to the entitlement, an autonomy entitlement must be structured to prevent unrelated economic surplus inducement, which means that it must, at minimum, be structured as a “simple autonomy entitlement” instead of a standard property entitlement.
Unrelated economic surplus inducement by a third party may be prevented simply by requiring that such third party may purchase the entitlement or waiver of the entitlement only with money or a direct substitute for the entitlement, or some combination thereof, what this article refers to as a “single-entitlement transaction.” The “simple autonomy entitlement” is the form of entitlement that precludes third parties from removing the entitlement via force, threat of force, fraud or any transaction other than a single-entitlement transaction. Where there is a risk that a designated third party will engage in unrelated economic surplus inducement that cannot be effectively detected or policed, it may be necessary to impose a greater restraint on alienability up to and including inalienability. Thus, for autonomy entitlements, the range of possible entitlement forms extends, from greatest to least alienability, from the simple autonomy entitlement – rather than the standard property entitlement – to the inalienable entitlement. The simple autonomy entitlement is the base entitlement form of autonomy entitlements and, thus, the analog of the standard property entitlement in the theory of property entitlements.
This article will show that distinguishing constitutional rights that are autonomy entitlements from those that are property entitlements provides the basis for a sound and concise unconstitutional conditions doctrine that helps regulate when the state may remove constitutional rights from citizens by direct purchase or by making delivery of a benefit contingent on waiver or transfer of a right. Turning to private law, the article will demonstrate that autonomy entitlements are incompatible with the standardized waivers of entitlements that have become common features of mass commerce transactions and that the theory of autonomy entitlements provides a precise economics-based explanation for why standardized waivers of autonomy entitlements must be disallowed and thus treated differently than either standardized transfers of property entitlements or waivers of autonomy entitlements that are subject to bargaining. Finally, the article suggests that, since standardized waivers or transfers of entitlements in market transactions compromise absolute retention autonomy in the same manner as the state making delivery of a benefit contingent on waiving or transfer an entitlement, designers of constitutional or legislative autonomy entitlements must address the potential threat posed by unrelated economic surplus inducement whether by the state or non-state market participants.
Calabresi and Melamed sparked a renaissance in legal entitlement theory by providing a simple economics-motivated typology of salient entitlement forms – property-rule entitlements, liability-rule entitlements and inalienable entitlements – that facilitates rigorous analysis of and precise conversations about which entitlement form is most efficient in different contexts. Calabresi and Melamed modestly suggested that theirs was only “one view of the Cathedral” – but it was intended to be the central view of the Cathedral informed by hardheaded economic analysis. Coase had posited that in a world without transaction costs resources would be allocated efficiently so long as they were made subject to clearly defined standard property entitlements independent of how such entitlements were initially assigned. Calabresi and Melamed advanced profitable theory much further by showing how in a world with significantly positive transaction costs maximizing efficiency depends both on choosing correctly from among different entitlement forms and on assigning entitlements to the right parties.
A deficiency in Calabresi and Melamed’s system of entitlement forms and related analytic approach, not remedied since, is that it does not facilitate precise economic analysis of entitlements the primary intent of which is to advance autonomy-related goals and thus has not been useful for design and interpretation of many of society’s most important legal entitlements. To work as intended, an autonomy entitlement must meet two distinct design objectives: 1. it must confer the specific intended autonomy benefits to the holder, such as privacy or religious freedom; and 2. it must confer to the holder absolute autonomy with respect to deciding whether to retain or cede the entitlement, referred to herein as “absolute retention autonomy,” since delivery of the intended autonomy benefits depends on the holder’s continued possession of the entitlement. Thus, for example, if an entitlement is intended to create a sphere of absolute autonomy vis-à-vis the state, then it is logically necessary that the entitlement must provide its holder with absolute retention autonomy free from any kind of state influence including by unrelated economic surplus inducement.
Though economics cannot explain why society values autonomy beyond that necessary to facilitate efficient bargaining, it can help to determine which form of autonomy entitlement should be chosen in a given factual setting to deliver most efficiently the intended retention autonomy. The first step is to define precisely the relevant autonomy entitlement forms from which lawmakers can choose. The most important autonomy entitlement form is the simple autonomy entitlement. Other salient forms of autonomy entitlements are the opt-in and opt-out autonomy entitlement forms and the market-inalienable entitlement form. The next step is to help lawmakers and jurists think about how to determine which autonomy entitlement form will provide the requisite retention autonomy at the lowest cost where markets are imperfect and transaction costs are significant. Incorporating this theory of autonomy entitlements and the simple autonomy entitlement form into the Calabresi and Melamed framework equips it to inform design and interpretation of autonomy-mot
ivated entitlements and enables an economics-based view of the Cathedral nave dedicated to fundamental constitutional rights and other individual liberties.
