David Sklansky (Stanford University) has posted How Should Juries Think About Reasonable Doubt? (Proof of Guilt: An Analysis of the Standard of Proof in Criminal Proceedings, John Jackson & Sarah Summers eds., Oxford University Press, forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
What kind of doubt should lead a jury to acquit a criminal defendant? This chapter, from a forthcoming edited volume on the standard of proof in criminal cases, makes two claims. The first is that the question of how jurors should understand the criminal standard of proof is distinct from, and at least as important as, the questions about reasonable doubt to which judges and scholars have devoted considerably more attention. The second is that when jurors are assessing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, they should engage in a particular kind of generalizing thought experiment. They should ask themselves whether any doubts that the evidence permits about the defendant’s guilt are the kinds of doubts that should, in general, lead to a verdict of acquittal in a criminal case.
Highly Recommended!
To receive new posts from Legal Theory Blog by email, get a free subscription to Legal Theory Stack.
Lawrence Solum