Curtis Bradley (University of Chicago Law School) has posted The Iran Conflict and the War Powers Resolution on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This Essay examines the operation of the War Powers Resolution (WPR) during the 2026 U.S. military conflict with Iran and considers what that episode reveals about the statute’s effectiveness. The conflict highlighted familiar weaknesses in the WPR, including the breadth of the time available for unilateral uses of force, the lack of a definition of “hostilities,” opportunities for executive branch workarounds through division and relabeling of conflicts, and Congress’s limited incentives to enforce the statute. But it also demonstrated that the WPR continues to affect the interactions between Congress and the President over the use of military force. In particular, the statute’s reporting requirements, sixty-day clock, and expedited legislative procedures create focal points that increase political pressure on the executive branch and make it easier for legislators to coordinate opposition to prolonged military operations. At the same time, however, the WPR helps to legitimize many unilateral presidential uses of force that are otherwise legally questionable. On balance, the WPR as currently structured may be doing more harm than good in terms of constraining unilateral presidential action.
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