Federico Picinali (London School of Economics) has posted Justified Belief as Standard of Proof: The (unsavoury?) Implications of an Interest-Relative Approach on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The article studies the implications of combining two widespread views. One is the view that justified belief ought to be the criminal standard of proof. The other is the view that justified belief is an interest-relative concept. The article considers a hypothetical decision rule implementing the justified belief standard, understood in interest-relative terms. While the rule seems indefensible, the article argues that there is more to the rule than meets the eye and that the rule is, in fact, a worthy option, provided that care is taken to understand and deploy its constituent parts. Analysing this decision rule — and questioning our intuitions about it — offer an opportunity to reflect on issues that have often interested evidence law scholars and legal theorists alike: the subjectivity of fact finding and the responsibility of the fact finder.
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