Cass R. Sunstein (Harvard Law School; Harvard University – Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)) has posted How to Disagree on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
How should one respond to an argument that one believes to be wrong, or egregiously wrong? What is the proper tone? Does disagreement have an internal morality? Does contempt have a place? Is respect the coin of the realm? These questions are relevant to everyone: family members, teachers, students, columnists, priests, United Nations ambassadors, academic writers of all kinds, scientists, lawyers and judges, politicians, and many more. A partial answer comes from the Rapoport Rules, which require a vivid, charitable statement of the argument that one is addressing, alongside an emphasis on what one accepts in it, and on what one has learned from it. The Rapoport Rules lower the volume and take down the temperature. From the social point of view, the Rapoport Rules might be taken as an effort to establish norms from which all or most benefit; they might solve or reduce a collective action problem. Widespread adoption of the Rapoport Rules would be a start toward acting in accordance with the internal morality of reasoned disagreement. They might well lead to better understanding and more in the way of truth. Still, it must be said that the argument in favor of the Rapoport Rules is contingent; much depends on the goals of the speaker or writer, and on their level of confidence, and the nature of the audience and the occasion. Some audiences are more likely to enjoy, and to be persuaded by, arguments that slash and burn. Notwithstanding these points, there is a reasonable argument for a presumption in favor of the Rapoport Rules in academic circles, in judicial opinions, and in legal briefs. There is also a reasonable argument for a presumption in favor of understatement and kindness, rather than “angry science.” These points can be seen as an effort to capture the internal morality of reasonable disagreement.
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The Rapoport Rules focus on actions, but there is a prior concern, which might be articulated as the Epistemtic Responsibility Principle. Judges and scholars who engage in criticism of the work of others have an epistemic duty to fully inform themselves of the work of those they criticize.
I think there is a corollary to the Principle of Epistemic Responsibility, which might be called the Duty of Epistemic Disclosure. Before you characterize someone else’s work, you should disclosure what you do and don’t know about the work. Frequently, critics have read one article or part of one article, and haven’t read the relevant body of work. Readers should be informed. The Duty of Epistemic Disclosure might actually encourage critics to read more! Or to tone down criticisms based on very partial readings.