Atinuke O. Adediran (University of Chicago Law School) has posted Solving the Pro Bono Mismatch (University of Colorado Law Review, Forthcoming 2020) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The pro bono interests of law firm lawyers tend to differ from the interests of poor clients. This difference results in the mismatch problem, or the incongruence between the interests of firm lawyers, and the needs of the poor. The mismatch problem can be serious, as it can result in the neglect of legal areas in which need is greatest. The literature on the mismatch problem is lacking in important ways. First, there is a lack of understanding about how the interests of individual lawyers factor into the selection of pro bono matters. Second, there is no understanding about how law firm culture impacts the choice of pro bono work for firms and individual lawyers. Third, the literature does not include how extrinsic factors impact the choice of pro bono work within firms. Finally, the literature is devoid of normative suggestions to remedy the problem. Through an interview based empirical exploration, this research provides an understanding of how individual lawyers impact the choice of pro bono work, how the firm culture impacts pro bono choices, and how the political climate directly shapes what lawyers choose to do for pro bono legal representation. Today, the mismatch problem has resulted in law firm lawyers’ demand of immigration law matters, while legal needs are greatest in housing and family law. This leaves nonprofit legal services organizations scrambling to find pro bono representation for poor clients, or otherwise relying on very limited resources to represent poor clients. To solve the pro bono mismatch, I make three proposals: (1) a modification of the language of the American Bar Association’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 6.1, which provides that lawyers have a professional responsibility to provide pro bono legal services; (2) creation and implementation of macro “pay for preference;” and (3) micro “pay for preference” regimes in law firms to nudge lawyers to consider the greatest legal needs in their choices of pro bono legal representation.