Stefan Voigt (University of Hamburg – Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)) has posted Contracting for Catastrophe: Legitimizing Emergency Constitutions by Drawing on Social Contract Theory on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
States of emergency are declared frequently in all parts of the world. Their declaration routinely implies a suspension of basic constitutional rights. In the last half century, it has become the norm for constitutions to contain an explicit “emergency constitution”, i.e., the constitutionally safeguarded rules of operation for a state of emergency. In this paper, I ask whether inclusion of an emergency constitution can be legitimized by drawing on social contract theory. I argue that there are important arguments, both against and in favor of constitutionalized emergency provisions, and that social contract theory – as applied by economists – can be of some help when deciding whether to have, or not to have an emergency constitution.