Andrej Kristan (University of Girona) has posted In Defense of the Expressive Conception of Norms (Reprinted in Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following Eds. Araszkiewicz et al., Springer, 2015, Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law (2014) 22) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Against three decades of objections made to the expressive conception of norms as presented by Alchourrón and Bulygin, the author of this paper purports to demonstrate, first, that their Expressivist accounts for facultative states of affairs without introducing inconsistencies into the normative system; second, that she can successfully describe the propositional content of a meta-rule without semanticizing the indicator of (normative) force of the object-rules; and third, that she can give an account of permissive closure even if she does not grant conceptual autonomy of acts of permitting. On the basis of these demonstrations, the author closes the paper with a suggestive solution for an adequate expressivist representation of conditional norms. The first parts of this paper are of a clarifying nature, whereas the last parts purport to present an advancement in the expressivist theory.