Ralf Poscher (Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg) has posted Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation (OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LANGUAGE AND LAW, Lawrence Solan & Peter Tiersma, eds., Oxford University Press, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
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Vagueness and ambiguity are key problems in theories of legal interpretation. The article first delimits vagueness and ambiguity and sets it into relation to related phenomena like the generality of legal expressions. Vagueness proofs to be a multi-faceted phenomenon which can be systematised along three distinctions: vagueness of individuation and classification, degree and combinatory vagueness, and semantic and pragmatic vagueness. For law pragmatic vagueness seems of specific import. As for the origins and accounts of vagueness the different approaches are sorted into logic, ontic, epistemic and semantic accounts with epistemic and semantic accounts showing the closest relations to legal theories of interpretation. The last section argues that vagueness is not a threat to legal interpretation and rule of law values properly understood. It is sceptical, though, of a supposed value of vagueness. It rather regards it a price to pay especially for the luxury of relying on generalized legal rules.
Highly recommended!
I've added this paper to the Legal Theory Lexicon entry: Legal Theory Lexicon 051: Vagueness and Ambiguity.