Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov (Columbia University – Law School) has posted Lawmakers as Lawbreakers
(William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
-
How would Congress act in a world without judicial review? This Article examines Congress’s capacity and incentives to enforce upon itself “the law of congressional lawmaking” – a largely overlooked body of law that is completely insulated from judicial enforcement. The Article explores the political safeguards that may motivate lawmakers to engage in self-policing and rule-following behavior. Its main argument is that the political safeguards that scholars and judges commonly rely upon to constrain legislative behavior actually motivate lawmakers to be lawbreakers.
In addition to providing insights about Congress’s behavior in the absence of judicial review, this Article’s examination has crucial importance to the debate about judicial review of the legislative process, the general debate on whether political safeguards reduce the need for judicial review, and the burgeoning new scholarship about legislative rules.
Recommended.