Hessick on the Exclusion of Good Acts from Sentencing

Carissa Byrne Hessick (Arizona State, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law) has posted Why are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors? (Boston University Law Review, Vol. 88, No. __, (forthcoming 2008)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Few pieces of information play a larger role in determining a criminal offender’s sentence than her prior criminal history. The notion that an offender’s prior bad acts ought to be considered an aggravating sentencing factor enjoys near-universal acceptance. But fewer jurisdictions appear to consider an offender’s prior good acts (such as honorable military service or charitable works) as a mitigating factor at sentencing. This Article discusses the potential relationship between aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors. It also explores whether, in light of the overwhelming consensus that a prior bad act is aggravating, there is a principled reason that a sentencing system could fail to treat a prior good act as mitigating.

I saw this fine paper presented at Law & Society in Montreal just a couple of weeks ago.  One of the interesting questions that emerged in discussion concerns the question what framework should be applied to normative analysis when a "first best option" (excluding both prior bad & good acts) is outside the feasible choice set.  (See Legal Theory Lexicon 011: Second Best)

Highly recommended.