Christopher Lowry (Dept. of Philosophy, Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada) has posted Beyond Equality of What: Sen’s Capability Approach and its Implications for Liberal Neutrality on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This paper looks at the intersection of three issues in liberal theory: the metric of advantage, neutrality vs. perfectionism, and justice and disability. I argue that Sen’s capability approach has implications for neutrality vs. perfectionism that demand a reconception of that debate. I draw out these implications to defend a third position, which I call ‘public value liberalism’. Measuring effective freedom in terms of capability requires a public ranking of valuable activities and states of being, which ultimately puts Sen’s view at odds with neutrality. The non-neutral elements of his view are nonetheless motivated and justified by considerations of state legitimacy, which makes the position I develop distinct from standard liberal state perfectionism. Public value liberalism defends a limited role for public deliberation about the good life within state forums, the results of which are to be used by the state to meet a condition of legitimacy: ensuring fair terms of cooperation for all citizens in light of human difference, including disability. After developing this position, I discuss whether Daniels’s response to Sen presents a difficulty for my view. I claim that it does not, arguing that Daniels’s position is more in line with public value liberalism than with the neutralism Daniels seeks to defend.
There is a "no citation" request on this paper–so I can’t give you additional excerpts. But I can highly recommend this–important topic, and in my opinion, on to a very promising line.