Neal Tognazzini has posted Responsibility vs. Blameworthiness on The Garden of Forking Paths. Here is a taste:
Nearly everyone agrees (I think) that an agent can be morally responsible without being praiseworthy or blameworthy. That is, in our terms above, an agent can be the sort of object to which reactive attitudes are appropriately applied without it being the case that any reactive attitude is justifiably applied to the agent in a particular circumstance. But what people disagree about (I think) is what gets you from moral responsibility to blameworthiness/praiseworthiness. So what is it?
Pereboom thinks (I think) that if you are morally responsible for a morally wrong action, then you are therefore blameworthy for it, and if you are morally responsible for a morally right action, then you are therefore praiseworthy for it. On his view, the only actions that an agent can be morally responsible for without being praiseworthy/blameworthy are morally neutral actions.
But others disagree. For instance, Fischer thinks that more is needed. Take his resopnse to Pereboom’s 4-case manipulation argument. Fischer has responded by saying that although the agent is morally responsible in all four cases, the agent is not blameworthy in all four cases. He stops short of actually telling us where the cut-off for blameworthiness comes, but he does say that it’s clear to him that in case 1, the agent is not blameworthy, whereas in case 4 (the deterministic case), the agent is blameworthy. I wonder what other conditions for blameworthiness Fischer has in mind here?