At Garden of Forking Paths, there is an Online Reading Group with initial comments by Al Mele on John Doris, Joshua Knobe, and Robert L. Woolfolk’s paper "Variantism about Responsibility". Here is the abstract of the paper:
The method of philosophy is, to a considerable extent, the method of cases, and nowhere is this more evident than in the literature on moral responsibility. The progress of philosophy is, as numerous observers have noted, afflicted with uncertainty, and this too is abundantly evident in the responsibility literature. One leading contributor – himself an ingenious practitioner of cases – warns of “dialectical stalemate” (Fischer 1994: 83-5; cf. Vargas 2004: 218); the major theoretical competitors, various versions of compatiblism and incompatiblism, are firmly entrenched, but hotly disputed. We contend that the methodological and substantive conditions of the responsibility literature are related. The method of cases is unlikely to provide unequivocal support for any of the orthodox philosophical contenders, because people’s responses across a diversity of cases will frequently manifest variation precluding a theoretically uniform result. However, a closer look at the method and its yield suggests the possibility of an illuminating departure from orthodoxy. In what follows, we present this departure for preliminary inspection, as we begin to articulate a view we call variantism about responsibility.
And a taste from Mele’s comments:
The idea for the supercomputer story was hatched here in Tallahassee at the Pitaria – a restaurant some of you know from conference lunches. Eddy Nahmias told the lunch group what he wanted to test, I suggested a supercomputer story that would entail that the world in which it is set is deterministic but would not use the word “determinism,” Eddy seemed a little reluctant to try such a story, and Joshua Knobe (who was here visiting for a few days and had a problem with his voice) quietly persuaded Eddy that it was a good idea. My thought about not using the word “determinism” was that, when people learn this word outside of a philosophy class, they “learn” that part of its *meaning* is “something that precludes free will and moral responsibility.” And even if one defines it for them in a standard philosophical way and encourages them to ignore what they used to think about its meaning, old linguistic habits die hard.