Symposium Announcement: Debt as Control at Cincinnati
- Debt as a Lever of Control
19th Annual Corporate Law Symposium
University of Cincinnati College of Law
March 31-April 1, 2006
The law of corporations tends to focus on the relationships between and among shareholders, managers, and directors. As a result, lawyers and scholars often overlook important contributions that creditors and other parties play in the governance of firms. This symposium will consider various ways that debt creates a lever for some degree of control over firms and other entities. It takes as a point of departure recent scholarship on creditor control in the context of corporate reorganizations. The symposium will address the current scope of creditor control and governance in the U.S. and other countries – especially Japan. Participants will consider how private creditors and bondholders may exercise control in different ways and how credit derivative products may alter the role that private creditors play in corporate governance. Participants will also explore some of the regulatory implications of creditors’ efforts to affect the governance of corporations and other entities.
Symposium papers:
“The Prime Directive”
Douglas Baird* & Robert Rasmussen*
“Creditor Control in the Sovereign Contract”
George Triantis* & Mitu Gulati
“Credit Derivatives and Creditor Governance”
David Skeel* & Frank Partnoy
“Creditors, Courts, and the Construction of Corporate Governance”
Melissa Jacoby
“Creditors and Corporate Governance”
Caroline Gentile*
“The Myth of Creditor Monitoring in Japan”
Mark Ramseyer* & Yoshiro Miwa
“Lender Control and Bank Regulation”
Adam Feibelman*
*attending participants
Additional information about the symposium is available at http://www.law.uc.edu/current/ccl06/index.html
Please send questions about the symposium to corporatelawuc@yahoo.com